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INTRODUCTION

L

ike the thousands of New Yorkers confronted with legal
crises each year, “MC,” a low-income woman, needed
representation in a divorce proceeding but could not afford
to retain private counsel. She contacted a small, nonprofit
legal organization for help. As New York’s Chief Justice, Jonathan
Lippman, and other prominent pro bono advocates have erected a
robust architecture for pro bono service, it is not surprising that the
organization placed her case with a private sector lawyer. The
attorney who ultimately agreed to represent MC on a pro bono basis
was an associate at one of the country’s largest and most highly
regarded law firms.
The firm handling MC’s case recently received the Litigation
Department of the Year designation from The American Lawyer
magazine. To its prospective, paying clients, this firm promises that
it “can rapidly assemble a focused, integrated and efficient team to
address all important aspects of a client’s problem and to handle
numerous cases in multiple jurisdictions and forums.”1 Yet, no such
team was assembled to handle MC’s case. Instead, the firm assigned
a junior associate to represent her. By all accounts, that novice
attorney worked in isolation from her colleagues. She failed to
consult with any seasoned litigators or negotiators when
complications arose in the case.
Moreover, her in-person
interactions with MC reflected either obliviousness or indifference to
her client’s concerns as a domestic violence survivor.2
Not only was MC’s attorney inexperienced, supervision practices
within the pro bono firm and capacity building efforts within the bar
inadequately prepared the attorney to zealously represent her client.
The attorney failed to take many steps that would be considered
1

Litigation, S KADDEN , A RPS , S LATE , M EAGHER & F LOM LLP,
http://www.skadden.com/practice/litigation (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
2
MC v. GC, 25 Misc.3d 217, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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routine in any litigation. She did not discuss legal standards relevant
to the client’s divorce and custody concerns. Instead, at the outset of
their attorney-client relationship, MC’s lawyer abandoned her in an
office with instructions to fill out a number of documents,
“describ[ing] what had happened in her marriage and why she was
seeking a divorce.”3 The attorney conceded that she would not
conduct any independent legal analysis into the facts MC described
but “that she would type up the information” and submit the signed
documents to the court.4 The attorney allowed months to elapse
without informing MC of material developments in the case.
Eventually, when settlement negotiations deteriorated, the attorney
pressured MC to waive certain rights to asset distribution and
relocation. Her letter to MC stated, among other things:
Please be advised that I was not retained for a
contested divorce, nor was I retained to advise you
regarding relocation. Rather you originally retained
me as pro bono counsel . . . I do not have the
experience or the time to handle a lengthy relocation
trial. However, once you obtain the divorce, if you
do obtain it, you are free to hire whomever you wish,
maybe even court appointed counsel, to litigate the
relocation issue.”5
Given her inability to afford alternative counsel, MC acquiesced to
her husband’s settlement demands, waiving her right to equitable
distribution and relinquishing her right to relocate with the child
without his consent or a court order.
These facts are drawn from the case, MC v. GC, one of the few
reported cases that address unethical behavior by elite attorneys who
perform direct legal service to poor individuals.6 Yet, the lack of
3

Id. at 220.
Id.
5
Id. at 223.
6
The pro bono attorney representing MC presented her client with an equitable
distributions waiver, a preprinted form created by the nonprofit referring
organization, without developing an informed understanding of marital property
distribution rules or the impact of executing the waiver. When the client requested
an explanation of the consequences of waiving her rights, the attorney said, “I told
4

3
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reported decisions on misconduct by pro bono attorneys representing
low-income clients is hardly indicative of quality of services
provided to indigent clients. On the contrary, one recent survey
showed that forty-seven percent of public interest law practitioners
who refer pro bono cases to law firms reported having “moderate” or
“extensive” problems with the services provided by private
attorneys.7 Other public interest lawyers relate that with alarming
frequency, pro bono attorneys appear to be inadequately equipped to
provide competent representation and lack the cultural awareness to
effectively serve diverse or challenging clients. 8 Behind closed
doors, many full-time public interest lawyers caution one another
about pro bono attorneys who have missed critical filing deadlines or
act with indifference to the needs of indigent litigants.
Even conscientious pro bono attorneys who possess the requisite
skills sometimes forsake their pro bono clients when obligations to
paying clients escalate. One nonprofit attorney lamented, “my own
experience showed me time and time again that institutional
commitments to pro bono work are often only as strong as the
amount of non-billable time that exists in the life of the pro bono
her that by waiving that at this point, you know, if she wasn’t interested, if she
waived her rights that she wouldn’t later be able to seek, go after them.” MC, 25
Misc.3d at 221. The attorney erroneously advised the client that if she voiced her
desire to move out of state prior to finalizing the divorce, the client would be
unsuccessful in seeking to relocate out-of-state with her child. Not only did the
pro bono attorney fail to conduct the research and preparation required to meet
Model Rule 1.1’s minimal competence standard, she did not associate or consult
with an attorney of established competence to protect the client’s interests. N.Y.
R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 3 (2014). The New York Supreme Court
concluded, “while the [client] had an attorney of record, she had no meaningful
representation on financial issues and custody.” MC, 25 Misc.3d at 228. The MC
court did not couch its opinion in terms of Model Rule 1.1, but it unambiguously
concluded that the attorney in question failed to provide competent representation
to her client. Id.
7
Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We
Know—and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 H ARV . L. & P OL ’ Y R EV .
83, 102 (2013).
8
Leonore F. Carpenter, “We’re Not Running a Charity Here”: Re-Thinking Public
Interest Lawyers’ Relationships with Bottom-Line Driven Pro Bono Programs, 29
B UFF . P UB . I NT . L. J. 37, 69–70 (2011); Theodore O. Fillette III, Thoughts on
Better Practices for Pro Bono Legal Service for Clients of Legal Services
Organizations, 45 C LEARINGHOUSE R EV . 116, 118 (2011).
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attorney.”9 Instances of pro bono attorneys seeking to terminate
representation of pro bono clients due to their work for paying
clients are all too common.
While many private sector attorneys offer pro bono legal services
that reflect the same level of diligence and skill characteristic of the
work done on behalf of their paying clients, the egregious failures
described in the MC v. GC case and those that occur in many
unreported matters highlight the dangers of pro bono initiatives
designed to bridge the “access to justice gap.” As used here, the
term “justice gap” refers to the chasm between the need for legal
representation in civil disputes and public interest attorneys available
to serve poor and working class clients. Justice gap pro bono
programs connect low-income individuals in need of legal assistance
in matters such as eviction prevention, family disputes, and
consumer debt collection cases with attorneys from large law firms
that typically specialize in commercial litigation and corporate
transactions. 10 Though well intentioned, justice gap pro bono
initiatives that succeed do so in spite of the impediments to ethical
representation that pervade this method of legal service delivery.
The market forces and “informal collegial control” 11 that shape
attorney conduct in the for-profit setting are often absent within the
world of pro bono service. Moreover, the ethics rules that should
govern pro bono attorneys offer inadequate guidance to lawyers
grappling with the unique concerns of pro bono lawyering practiced
in a for-profit context.

9

Carpenter, supra note 8, at 64–65.
The term “justice gap” was repeatedly used by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman
of the New York Court of Appeals who championed amendments to attorney
admission rules to require bar applicants to complete at least 50 hours of pro bono
service as a condition of admission. See generally Lydia Chan, New York’s New
Rule: A Novel Approach to Closing the Access to Justice Gap, 26 G EO . J. L EGAL
E THICS 597 (2013). As used here, “justice gap pro bono” does not encompass
public interest class actions, law reform litigation, criminal defense, and free
services provided to nonprofit institutions.
11
For an overview of how informal collegial control combines with formal
systems of ethics oversight in different practice settings, see Leslie C. Levin &
Lynn Mather, Why Context Matters, in L AWYERS IN P RACTICE: E THICAL
D ECISION M AKING IN C ONTEXT 3, 3–5 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds.,
2012).
10

5
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It may be tempting to conclude that the Model Rules and their
state-level corollaries equally inform all attorney-client relationships,
regardless of whether the client pays for services. However, that
theoretically attractive conclusion is at odds with reality. In fact,
many attorneys conceptualize pro bono work as a form of legal
charity, unmoored from the moderating influence of ethics rules and
practice norms with which they are most familiar. Furthermore, the
Model Rules and their state law analogues favor indeterminate,
highly subjective ethics norms over specific guidance on how rules
should be applied in day-to-day practice. This approach may be
sufficient when the professional identities of attorneys are aligned
with those of their clients and practice-specific conventions
supplement formal ethics rules. However, no robust system of
ethical guidance governs pro bono lawyers who lack such support.
When the ethics conventions with which pro bono attorneys are most
familiar seem inapplicable, the Model Rules framework
insufficiently instructs pro bono practice.
The purpose of this article is not to denigrate pro bono service.
Each year, countless individuals who would otherwise proceed
without legal help of any kind benefit from pro bono assistance;
neither is it my aim to critique the “misaligned incentives”
underlying legal volunteerism.12 Those topics have been explored
expertly by a number of experienced practitioners and legal scholars.
It is also not my intention to malign individual attorneys who accept
pro bono matters amidst the considerable pressure to serve paying
clients. Rather, this article will first discuss the role of justice gap
pro bono in meeting the civil legal needs of the poor. It will then
address the ways in which the justice gap pro bono model of
expanding civil legal services inadequately self-regulates attorney
conduct. After turning attention to specific elements of the ABA’s
Model Rules that inadequately address contemporary pro bono
practice, I will suggest possible reasons for the Model Rules’
inattention to these issues and propose a few modest
recommendations for incorporating guidance for pro bono attorneys
into the existing ethical framework.

12

Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by
Doing Better, 78 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2357, 2430 (2010).
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I.
A.

UNDERSTANDING PRO BONO SERVICE IN CONTEXT

Pro Bono as a Remedy for Insufficient Civil Legal Resources

Fewer than twenty percent of the low-income people facing
eviction, debt collection actions, divorce, and other legal crises
involving necessities of life have access to legal counsel.”13 In fact,
more than two million pro se litigants appear each year in New York
courts alone.14 New York is not the only jurisdiction to experience a
significant increase in the number of self-represented parties in
recent years. In California, for example, approximately seventy-five
percent of parties in divorce cases appear without attorneys.15 Even
the federal courts have not escaped the growing “pro se
phenomenon.”16 Nearly forty percent of all cases filed in federal
court involve an unrepresented party.17
State courts of limited jurisdiction that handle housing, family, or
low dollar figure disputes are intended to be accessible to selfrepresented litigants. However, pro se parties appearing in these
forums often lack a basic understanding of the substantive claims
and defenses relevant to their cases. They frequently struggle to
satisfy basic procedural requirements to commence litigation or
pursue discovery. In my current practice, I encounter many litigants
whose otherwise meritorious claims were dismissed when set forth
in pro se petitions due to the client’s inability to effectuate service of
process or file necessary documents. Pro se litigants unfamiliar with
basic court rules and the substantive law governing their dispute

13

Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 T UL . L. R EV . 727, 730
(2014); see also L EGAL S ERVS . C ORP ., D OCUMENTING THE J USTICE G AP IN
A MERICA : T HE C URRENT U NMET C IVIL L EGAL N EEDS OF L OW -I NCOME
A MERICANS 14 (2009), available at
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_
america_2009.pdf.
14
Jonathan Lippman, Law in the 21st Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging
Challenges, Remarks at Law Day 2010 (May 3, 2010), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Law%20Day%202010.pdf.
15
See generally Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U. J. P UB . L.
373, 376 (2005).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 377.
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compromise efficiency in these courts where judges already labor
under heavy dockets.18
Leaders within the judiciary and other advocates seeking to
bridge this gap between civil legal needs and available legal services
have proposed a number of recommendations to expand available
assistance to poor litigants. Nationwide, bar associations and
scholars encourage legal services and low fee attorneys to offer
“unbundled” or limited scope services to pro se litigants who cannot
afford to retain counsel for full representation in civil cases. 19
Others advocate for demystification and streamlining of procedures
for unrepresented parties. 20
However, the dominant
recommendation to address the unmet need for civil legal assistance
is to expand pro bono service by private sector attorneys.21 Access
to justice commissions from Hawaii to New York promote pro bono
participation as a way to improve poor people’s access to legal
18

Judge Benita Pearson, a federal judge in Ohio, fears that without expanding the
ranks of attorneys who offer full representation to low- and moderate-income
litigants, the increase in pro se litigation will reduce courts to “a crawl.” Jack P.
Sahl, Real Metamorphosis or More of the Same: Navigating the Practice of Law in
the Wake of Ethics 20/20—Globalization, New Technologies, and What It Means
to Be a Lawyer in These Uncertain Times, 47 AKRON L. REV. 1, 28 (2014).
19
See generally Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and
the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 G EO . J. ON P OVERTY L. & P OL ’ Y
453 (2011); Justice Fern Fisher-Brundveen & Rochele Klempnor, Unbundled
Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 F ORDHAM U RB . L. J.
1107 (2002).
20
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Deconstructing the Right to Counsel, A M . C ONST .
S OC ’ Y FOR L. & P OL ’ Y 11 (July 22, 2014), available at
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Lucas__Deconstructing_the_Right_to_Counsel.pdf; Charles R. Dyer et al., Improving
Access to Justice: Plain Language Family Law Court Forms in Washington State,
11 S EATTLE J. FOR S OC . J UST . 1065, 1065 (2013).
21
Lininger, supra note 13, at 736. In his August 2013 address to the American
Bar Association, Attorney General Eric Holder urged attendees to “answer the
ABA’s call to contribute to this cause through pro bono service—and help realize
the promise of equal justice for all.” Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html. The
National Center for State Courts offers similarly enthusiastic support for pro bono
expansion. See generally Pro Bono and Volunteer Programs, N ATIONAL C ENTER
FOR S TATE C OURTS , http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/access-tojustice/home/Topics/Pro-Bono-and-Volunteer-Programs.aspx (last visited Nov. 24,
2014).
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information and full representation in civil litigation. 22 A number of
jurisdictions have even proposed rule changes that would allow
private attorneys not licensed in the state to perform pro bono
services.23 For example, New York recently expanded pro bono
opportunities for non-lawyer advocates, law students, and in-house
counsel not admitted to practice in an effort to bridge this gap.24 The
state also implemented mandatory pro bono reporting requirements,
presumably to shame attorneys into increasing their pro bono
service.25
B.

Evolution of the Pro Bono Market
The American approach to providing civil legal assistance to
low-income litigants who cannot retain counsel can be analogized to
“a three legged stool, resting on the work of three distinct groups of
lawyers: i) those funded by the federal Legal Services
Corporation,” 26 ii) full-time poverty lawyers who practice in
22

See Access to Justice Room Attorneys Recognized, H AW . S TATE J UD . (Mar. 7,
2013),
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/news_and_reports/featured_news/2013/03/pro_bono.
html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014); Task Force to Expand Civil Legal Services in NY,
N.Y. S TATE U NIFIED C T . S YS ., https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legalservices/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
23
See, e.g., Arkansas Access to Justice Commission Proposes Rule Change at the
Mid Year Meeting, A RK . L EGAL S ERVS . P’ SHIP (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.arlegalservices.org/node/573 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
24
See 22 NYCRR § 522.8; see also Fern Fisher, Moving Toward a More Perfect
World: Achieving Equal Access to Justice Through a New Definition of Judicial
Activism, 17 CUNY L. REV. 285 (2015); Daniel C.W. Lang, Utilizing Nonlawyer
Advocates to Bridge the Justice Gap in America, 17 W IDENER L. R EV . 289, 300
(2011); Hon. Jonathan Lippman, The State of the Judiciary 2014: Vision and
Action in Our Modern Courts (2014), available at
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/soj2014.pdf.
25
Chan, supra note 10, at 599–600; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 22, §
118.1(e)(14) (2013) (requiring that each attorney, as part of his or her biennial
registration in New York, report (1) the number of hours that the registrant
voluntarily spent providing legal services free of charge to poor and underserved
clients, and (2) the amount of voluntary financial contributions the registrant made
to organizations providing legal services to the poor and underserved during the
previous biennial registration period).
26
LSC is a congressionally-funded, grant-making entity created in 1974 “that
responds to locally initiated proposals for providing civil legal services to the
indigent.” Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and Market-Reliant

9
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nonprofit settings funded by philanthropic entities, private donations,
and government grants independent of the LSC, and iii) volunteer
attorneys from the private sector.27 LSC-funded programs provide
the bulk of legal representation to low-income individuals in civil
matters. Annually, LSC distributes nearly $350,000,000 to more
than 130 legal services organizations across the country.28 The level
of pro bono participation in those LSC-funded organizations has
steadily increased in recent years. Between 2011 and 2012, for
example, the number of cases closed by pro bono attorneys grew by
twelve percent. At current levels, the pro bono hours reported by
LSC grant recipients amounts to nearly thirty percent of the hours
served by all of the full-time, staff attorneys employed in LSCfunded programs.29 Even non-LSC-affiliated nonprofits that receive
funds from interest on lawyer trust accounts and other forms of
funding must meticulously document and report every hour of pro
bono assistance their clients receive by members of the private bar,
another way to encourage nonprofits to incorporate pro bono
volunteers into their legal services delivery systems.30
The dramatic growth of pro bono programs during the 1990s
occurred partly in response to federal divestment from the LSC
during that same period.31 Many of the legal nonprofits that today
refer clients for pro bono help are organizations with a Civil Rights
era history of pursuing social justice on behalf of low-income
people.32 One conservative reaction to the law reform and antipoverty organizing work once central to the mission of these
Legal Aid, in P RIVATE L AWYERS & THE P UBLIC I NTEREST: T HE E VOLVING
R OLE OF P RO B ONO IN THE L EGAL P ROFESSION 96 (Robert Granfield & Lynn
Mather eds., 2009). In 2014, the LSC was responsible for distributing more than
$400 million in funds to nationwide grantees. LSC FY 2014 Funding, L EGAL
S ERVS . C ORP ., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/funding/lsc-fy-2014-funding (last
visited Nov. 13, 2014).
27
Sandefur, supra note 26, at 95–96.
28
LSC 2013 Annual Report, L EGAL S ERVS . C ORP .,
http://www.lsc.gov/about/2013-annual-report (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
29
Sandefur, supra note 26, at 96.
30
See New York IOLTA Grantee Activity Report.
31
Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7.
32
Corey S. Shadamiah, Legal Services Lawyers: When Conceptions of Lawyering
and Values Clash, in L AWYERS IN P RACTICE: E THICAL D ECISION M AKING IN
C ONTEXT, supra note 11, at 323–25.
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organizations was the imposition of congressional restrictions on
legal services funding. As conservative opposition to LSC’s
political positions mounted, LSC funding decreased precipitously,
dropping fifty percent from 1980 to 2009.33 By the late 1990s, LSC
grantees faced a host of new restrictions on their work with the
imposition of congressional restrictions on both the nature of the
cases they could litigate and the types of individuals these
organizations could serve. 34 Those restrictions also require
“grantees [to] make a ‘substantial amount’ of funds available for
[p]rivate [a]ttorney [i]nvolvement,” money principally directed
towards expanding pro bono volunteer capacity. 35 Nonprofit
organizations that receive funding from the LSC must allocate
twelve and a half percent of their federal grants to pro bono “joint
ventures.”36 The number of formal, pro bono programs increased
tenfold between 1980 and 1985 and then doubled again between
1985 and 2004.37
While congressional control of LSC funding served as one factor
driving the increase in pro bono activity, changes in the for-profit
market for legal services exerted a powerful influence on the
development of these programs. Elite firms in the major legal
markets of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City and Washington
D.C. expanded significantly from the 1990s until the 2008
recession.38 These firms increasingly concentrated their practices on
more high-stakes litigation and specialized transactions on behalf of
their corporate clients at the expense of assisting in a broad range of
33

Scott L. Cummings, The Future of Public Interest Law, 33 U. A RK . L ITTLE
R OCK L. R EV . 355, 363 (2011).
34
See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–34, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see also Scott L. Cummings, The
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. R EV . 1, 22 (2004) [hereinafter Cummings,
Politics]. With the exception of some emergency assistance and help for certain
victims of violence, LSC grantees are largely precluded from serving
undocumented immigrants. See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal
Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 C ARDOZO L. R EV . 619, 674
(2011).
35
Cummings, supra note 33, at 362.
36
45 C.F.R. § 1614.2 (2013).
37
Cummings, supra note 33, at 362.
38
See generally Albert Yoon, Competition and the Evolution of Large Law Firms,
63 D E P AUL L. R EV . 697 (2014).
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matters of varying size and complexity.39 To staff these matters,
elite firms recruited a proverbial army of relatively inexperienced
attorneys that sometimes face periods of low activity on paying
matters.40 It is this pool of associates that periodically has surplus
capacity to accept assignments that most frequently staff justice gap
pro bono initiatives. Firms employing this staffing structure
discovered the recruiting and retention potential of pro bono work.
Over time, major-market firms embraced pro bono participation as a
way to train novice associates without passing those costs along to
their corporate clients.
The confluence of funding imperatives and structural changes in
major legal markets resulted in elite members of the private bar
dominating pro bono practice. In 1984, approximately forty percent
of all pro bono hours served in organized pro bono programs were
contributed by attorneys employed at firms of twenty or more
lawyers.41 Today, urban law firms with more than one hundred
attorneys provide the largest number of hours of free legal assistance
to low-income clients and nonprofit organizations, even though large
firm attorneys constitute less than twenty percent of all lawyers in
private practice.42
Justice gap pro bono programs based in elite law firms do more
than simply link well-heeled attorneys with low-income individuals
facing legal crises. At a macro level, they seek to remedy three
related problems in the legal services market: the inability of law
39

These practice-area changes shifted firms away from both their holistic
counseling role, one that occasionally required generalist, “full service” practices,
towards an increasingly specialized form of practice that leaves fewer
opportunities to develop the skills commonly used by attorneys who represent
individual clients. See David Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism, in
L AWYERS IN P RACTICE: E THICAL D ECISION M AKING IN C ONTEXT, supra note
11, at 27–30.
40
Jack W. Londen, The Impact of Pro Bono Work on Law Firm Economics, 9 G EO.
J. L EGAL E THICS 925, 925 (1996) (“A law firm employs the right-sized staff to
handle all the billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including
business development, firm administration and pro bono work. The firm also
usually has some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the
firm’s lawyers are willing to work”); see also Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro
Bono, 78 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2443, 2448 (2010).
41
Sandefur, supra note 26, at 100.
42
ABA S TANDING C OMM . ON P RO B ONO & P UB . S ERVS ., S UPPORTING J USTICE
III: A R EPORT ON THE P RO B ONO W ORK OF A MERICA ’ S L AWYERS 5 (2013).

2015

PRO BONO AND THE MODEL RULES

firms to properly train new associates at their clients’ expense; the
dissatisfaction of many young associates that leads to high rates of
turnover; and the paucity of attorneys willing to handle matters for
which little profit can be generated.43 Given these objectives and the
direct benefits that accrue to for-profit firms as a result of their
participation in pro bono initiatives, it has become increasingly
difficult to argue that justice gap lawyering is truly service provided
in pro bono publico. Unlike the typical case in which the client is
the primary beneficiary of legal services and the firm is rewarded
with fees, the intended beneficiary of justice gap pro bono service
are entities other than the client: the pro bono attorney whose skills
are enhanced on a case that poses little or no financial risk to the
firm; the firms that benefit from the improved recruitment and
retention; and the corporate clients that receive higher quality legal
services without incurring training costs. 44 Increasingly popular
“pro bono joint ventures” between law firms and their corporate
clients aim to serve law firms’ business development goals.45 While
participants in these programs seek to “do good” by offering legal
services, the objective of these programs is not simply to improve
the efficient delivery of services to clients in crisis or expand the
scope of high-quality services offered to indigent persons. Rather,
their overarching objective is to forge more productive working
relationships between in-house counsel offices and outside law firms
for business development purposes.46
43

Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. P UB . L. 373, 380 (2005).
Roy S. Ginsburg, Makes Cents: The Business Case for Pro Bono, 62 B ENCH &
B. M INN . 1, 2 (2005), available at
http://www.royginsburg.com/files/cle_article_3.pdf (“For attorneys in private
practice, pro bono service can be strategically used for client development.”);
Reena N. Glazer, Revisiting the Business Case for Law Firm Pro Bono, 51 S. T EX .
L. R EV . 563, 586 (2010) (“[I]n troubled times, the role of pro bono in enhancing
morale and creating a sense of calm, teamwork, and mutual respect and support is
unparalleled.”).
45
Glazer, supra note 44, at 573.
46
Ginsburg explained, “One never hears about lawyers turning away paying work
because they were too busy doing pro bono service. Nevertheless, many find the
time to make sure pro bono service is one of the things that ‘get done.’
Furthermore, it’s worth questioning the assumption that attorneys who perform pro
bono work make significant financial sacrifices. Last year, the American Lawyer
magazine ranked the pro bono efforts of the nations’ major law firms based on the
average number of hours per lawyer and the percentage of lawyers who performed
44
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MODEL RULE 6.1 AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CHARITY
Voluntary Legal Service Before Model Rule 6.1

When the ABA’s House of Delegates passed a resolution in
August 1975, “confirming the basic responsibility of each lawyer
engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal
services without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in . . . poverty
law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization
representation, and administration of justice,” 47 it did not
differentiate between the elite law firms that would come to
dominate the pro bono landscape and other practitioners in small and
solo practices; nor did it distinguish between novice and experienced
attorneys. All attorneys share the obligation to offer legal assistance
for the public good. Thirteen years later, that resolution was
formalized in Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules, which the overwhelming
majority of States have adopted with some variations. 48 Under
Model Rule 6.1, attorneys should dedicate fifty hours each year to
pro bono work. Qualifying activities include providing legal advice
or representation for free or at significantly reduced rates to “persons
of limited means” and organizations that provide services to such
individuals.49
The ABA’s 1975 resolution and subsequent rule change reflected
a significant departure from historical conceptions of pro bono
lawyering. Throughout most of America’s legal history, attorneys
dispensed “ad hoc and individualized” assistance as a form of

more than 20 hours of pro bono service per year. Of the ten firms ranked highest,
all had very healthy profits per partner, most between $500,000 and $1 million or
more.” Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 2.
47
J AYNE B. T YRRELL , T HE L AW F IRM P RO B ONO M ANUAL 2 (1989).
48
Id. For a description of how Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and
Washington have approached Rule 6.1, see Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy
Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate Legal Services for the Poor, 20
C ORNELL J. L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y 571, 609 (2011).
49
It is important to note that Rule 6.1 does not, in fact, obligate attorneys to
provide free legal help for the poor. Rather, lawyers may satisfy Rule 6.1 by
participating in “legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision
of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means” as
well as “activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession.”
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 6.1, cmts. 2–3, 8 (2012).
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“professional charity.” 50 Traditionally, individual attorneys who
provided “pro bono service” performed work within their regular
area of practice and simply forgave legal bills that a client was
unable to pay. As Judith Maute described in her discussion of pro
bono regulation, nineteenth century conceptions of attorney
professional conduct reflected a “reactive” approach to practice and
suggested that attorneys should not turn away poor clients who
solicited legal advice.51 The Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama
State Bar in 1887 recommended that lawyers make downward fee
adjustments and waive fees for certain poor clients but “[s]tate[d] no
expectation that all lawyers would engage in some work for the
public good.” 52 Indeed, Canon 12 of the ABA’s Cannons of
Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, simply advised that an
individual’s “poverty” or status as a widow or orphan could justify
the extension of special professional considerations such as free
legal assistance.53 The ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility,
precursor to the Model Rules, similarly explained that “[t]he basic
responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay
ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal
involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the
most rewarding experiences in the life of the lawyer.”54
Before the modern pro bono era, litigators interested in a
particular cause frequently offered free representation to an
individual defendant or social activist who was unable to pay for
services due to the compelling nature of the matter at issue. The
example of one of New York’s most esteemed law firms, Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP, illustrates this historical pro bono model. In
1803, one of Cravath’s founding partners “defended the first Native
American tried for the murder of a white man in the State of New
York” and another “represented a recently released ex-convict
50

Cummings, Politics, supra note 34, at 6.
Judith Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities
from Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 T UL . L. R EV . 91, 98–100
(2002).
52
Id. at 109.
53
David J. Dreyer, Culture, Structure, and Pro Bono Practice, 33 J. L EGAL P ROF.
185, 193–94 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the
History of the 1908 Canons, 24 L AW & S OC . I NQUIRY 1 (1999).
54
ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980).
51

15

16

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

accused of stealing six cents worth of fabric.”55 In the 1820s, the
firm accepted two other pro bono matters that helped to establish the
insanity defense in criminal proceedings. 56 Later, during the
Progressive Era, social justice and law reform organizations like the
NAACP and the National Consumer League routinely “relied on
outside lawyers, recruited from the upper echelons of the bar” to
handle test cases on a pro bono basis.57
These and countless other examples of nineteenth and early
twentieth century pro bono activity reveal a conception of pro bono
service “as an unanticipated extension of professional courtesy
toward community members who could not afford” counsel or
something akin to a “quasi-religious obligation to assist the poor.”58
The pro bono attorneys chose to represent nonpaying clients, and
forego billing on other matters, because of the attorneys’ personal
investments in matters, not as a formal ethical imperative. Of
particular note, history’s pro bono attorneys, like Cravath’s founding
partners and Progressive Era advocates, were already experienced
practitioners when they represented clients on a pro bono basis.
Their uncompensated representation of impecunious individuals was
never intended to fill gaps in their substantive knowledge of the law;
nor did those attorneys anticipate that their pro bono case handling
could correct deficiencies in the legal market as a whole.
B.

Pro Bono and Business Development
Justice gap pro bono initiatives at elite law firms complicate the
concept of pro bono service by divorcing pro bono legal assistance
from the notion of financial sacrifice for the public good. Attorneys
like the Cravath partners and Progressive Era advocates referenced
above offered pro bono services at the expense of their for-profit
practice. Such is a reasonable price for the profession’s monopoly
on the ability to provide legal services. 59 Today’s pro bono
initiatives, on the other hand, are designed to increase firm
55

Philosophy: A Proud History, C RAVATH , S WAINE & M OORE LLP,
http://www.cravath.com/proudhistory/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
56
Id.
57
Susan Carle, Re-Envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering: Some Historical
Reflections, 9 A M . U. J. G END . S OC . P OL ’ Y & L. 81, 93 (2001).
58
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 46.
59
Maute, supra note 51, at 138 n.273.
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profitability, not displace work on paying matters. The highly
leveraged structure of large, major market law firms has not only
allowed these firms to successfully exploit inequalities in the legal
system to generate high profits, it facilitates legal “volunteerism” by
associates who periodically experience reduced workloads on paying
matters.60 In contrast, small firm and solo practitioners, attorneys
who may have more experience working with individual clients than
their large firm counterparts, typically lack the excess staffing and
related profit margins that support large firm pro bono
involvement.61 Furthermore, associates at large firms provide direct
services to indigent clients while receiving a salary not reduced by
their hours spent in pro bono service.62 Accordingly, the current
firm-focused pro bono model disproportionately benefits the highest
earners within the legal market who, by taking advantage of the
pyramid-like structure of law firms that can afford to “donate”
time. 63 While the transformation of pro bono service as an
60

Referencing principles of game theory, Tom Spahn concluded that pro bono
service can “improv[e] the firm’s tendency toward creating innovative solutions to
complex problems in its billable work” by “allowing the firm to explore the legal
strategic landscape-learning new skills, experimenting with new research tools,
and sharing abilities across various attorney groups.” Tom Spahn, Law Firms
Competing on the “Edge of Chaos”: Pro Bono’s Role in a Winning Competitive
Strategy, 35 U. H AW . L. R EV . 345, 382 (2013); see also Londen, supra note 40, at
925 (concluding that large firms employ sufficient associates “to handle all the
billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including business
development, firm administration and pro bono work. The firm also usually has
some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the firm’s lawyers
are willing to work.”); John R. Maley, Pro Bono in Law Firms, in B UILDING A
P RO B ONO P RACTICE G ROUP: L EADING L AWYERS ON S ERVING THE
C OMMUNITY ’ S L EGAL N EEDS , Astapore, 2013 WL 2728923, at *6 (2013)
(“Theoretically, lost billable revenue would be a cost of pro bono work, but in
practice we have not experienced that; pro bono work tends to come from other
non-billable lawyer time (social, leisure, etc[.]).”); D EBORAH L. R HODE , P RO
B ONO IN P RINCIPLE AND IN P RACTICE 177 (2005).
61
Londen, supra note 40, at 925 (“For smaller firms, the unavailability of
particular lawyers is likely to cost the firm billable matters.”).
62
Sandefur, supra note 26, at 101–02.
63
It should come as no surprise that the revolt against New York State’s
mandatory pro bono reporting requirements is being led by attorneys from smaller
firms located outside of New York City. See Joel Stashenko, State Bar to Hire
Counsel Over New Pro Bono Rule, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 3, 2014 (“a former state bar
president and House of Delegates member [] said a fifty-hour pro bono goal would
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affirmative duty may have increased the number of attorneys serving
poor clients, situating free legal services within this business
paradigm creates tensions not remedied in the Model Rules or other
sources of generally applicable professional guidance.
Shortly after the ABA adopted Rule 6.1 on pro bono service, it
published a manual for law firms, particularly large firms, to
promote the creation of formal pro bono programs. Therein, the
ABA advised firms that pro bono programs confer numerous
benefits upon large firms and their associates. It argued that
representation of poor clients can “develop valuable legal skills” in
inexperienced lawyers, “improve[] associate morale,” and “diminish
associate turnover.” 64 The ABA’s guide recommended that law
firms establish pro bono committees and appoint pro bono
coordinators to serve as intermediaries between referring legal
services organizations and firm associates.65 Firms generally applied
these principles when developing their pro bono infrastructure.66
Notably, though, the ABA’s early blueprint for large firm pro bono
practices remained silent about steps firms should take to guarantee
that pro bono clients receive high quality representation or address
ethical concerns inherent in these programs. Aside from its
admonition that junior associates be appropriately supervised, the
ABA offered no input on how to ensure pro bono attorney
competence or sensitize associates to the needs of low-income
individuals from diverse communities.67
While the ABA’s Standing Committee on Public Service
continues to play a leading role in pro bono institutionalization, the
Washington, DC-based nonprofit, Pro Bono Institute (“PBI”), has
assumed a leadership role in establishing standards for pro bono
projects in large law firms and corporate counsel offices across the
country.68 Through its periodic training and annual events, PBI
impose a burden on solo and small firm practitioners which made up two-thirds of
the state’s legal profession.”).
64
T YRRELL , supra note 47, at 3.
65
Id. at 8.
66
Cummings, Politics, supra note 34, at 5.
67
T YRRELL , supra note 47, at 4.
68
PBI is a member organization organized around several projects, all of which
provide technical assistance to law firms and/or corporate legal departments
interested in handling pro bono cases. Esther Lardent, PBI’s president, has had a
long professional relationship with the ABA. See Nikki LaCrosse, The Life and
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educates law firms on how to establish economically feasible pro
bono initiatives. PBI’s training materials advise law firms on how to
structure their in-house pro bono committees, establish pro bono
ventures with corporate clients and control the costs of pro bono
engagements.69 PBI also instructs law firms and corporate counsel
departments to conceptualize pro bono opportunities as tools for
companies to improve associate retention, boost morale and
“stimulate and satisfy experienced and knowledgeable staff.”70 PBI
has noted a growing trend toward the development of joint pro bono
ventures between and among legal departments and their outside
counsel that “enable[] outside counsel to gain a better understanding
of the client legal department so they can better respond to its
commercial needs.” 71 Absent from their offerings are training
materials on how firms can effectively monitor the outcomes of pro
bono representation or assess associates’ ability to communicate
effectively with diverse clients.
Notably, PBI’s publications do not stress adherence to any set of
ethics rules for the purpose of protecting pro bono clients. Rather,
the scant ethical guidance it provides to firms focus primarily on
limiting firms’ liability exposure in connection with pro bono
matters.72 For example, PBI’s Pro Bono Ethics Handbook contains a
chapter on associate supervision. It admonishes that firm attorneys
handling pro bono matters “are often inexperienced and unable to
provide competent representation,” but offers no technical support or
practical recommendations for overcoming these deficiencies. 73
Career of Esther Lardent, L AW C ROSSING ,
http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/1263/Esther-LardentPresident-and-CEO-ofthe-Pro-Bono-Institute-Washington-DCAdjunct-Professor-of-Law-at-GeorgetownUniversityFulbright-Fellow/# (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
69
See generally Law Firm Pro Bono Project Resource Clearinghouse, P RO B ONO
I NSTITUTE, http://www.probonoinst.org/clearinghouse (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
70
Esther F. Lardent, The Business Case for In-House Pro Bono (2012), available
at http://www.cpbo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/The-Business-Case-for-InHouse-Pro-Bono.pdf.
71
Id.
72
See generally Ethical Issues, P RO B ONO I NSTITUTE,
http://www.probonoinst.org/clearinghouse/category/ethical-issues/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2014).
73
Kit A. Pierson, Pro Bono Ethics Handbooks: Ethical Duty to Supervise Lawyers
in Pro Bono Matters, P RO B ONO I NSTITUTE at 4–7 (2010).
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After noting differences in vicarious liability standards across
jurisdictions, PBI simply advises supervisors to provide “reasonably
competent” supervision and “actively ensure” their subordinates’
ethical compliance. 74 This recommendation does not establish
sufficiently clear practice norms for the community of pro bono
attorneys.
C. Existing Standards for Poverty Lawyers not Incorporated into
Pro Bono Mandate
As a general matter, the Model Rules avoid matters of cultural
competence and client-centered lawyering. It is surprising, then, to
note that the ABA has adopted detailed technical guidance for
attorneys who represent low-income clients, including persons with
diverse linguistic and cultural attributes. Over the years, it
promulgated standards and repeatedly revised guidelines for
nonprofit entities that provide civil legal assistance and operators of
pro bono programs, the first and second legs of the “three legged
stool” of civil legal service delivery for poor individuals. These
exacting principles that the ABA addresses to full-time poverty
lawyers outline best practices when profit is not an issue.
In 1961, more than a decade before passing the first resolution on
voluntary pro bono service, the ABA adopted its first set of
standards for the operation of civil legal aid programs for the poor,
such as those funded by the LSC.75 With input from the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association and other attorneys engaged in
full-time nonprofit work, the Civil Legal Aid Standards set forth
objective, client-centered guidelines for the provision of culturally
competent representation. “[R]esponsiveness to the needs of lowincome communities and of clients who are served,” “achieving
results,” and treating persons with dignity and respect are core
objectives outlined in the Civil Legal Aid Standards, along with the
goals of facilitating “access to justice,” providing “high quality and
effective assistance,” and ensuring “zealous representation of client
74

Id. at 4, 6–7.
ABA S TANDING C OMMITTEE ON L EGAL A ID AND I NDIGENT D EFENDANTS ,
S TANDARDS FOR P ROVIDERS OF C IVIL L EGAL S ERVICES TO THE P OOR (2002),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sc
laid/civilstandards.authcheckdam.pdf.
75
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interests.”76 The Civil Legal Aid Standards also require nonprofit
attorneys to offer “culturally competent” representation, defined as
“the capacity to provide effective legal assistance that is grounded in
an awareness of and sensitivity to the diverse cultures in the
provider’s service area . . . having the capacity to interact effectively
and to understand how the cultural mores and the circumstances of
the persons from diverse communities affect their interaction with
the provider and its practitioners and govern their reaction to their
legal problems and to the process for resolving them.”77 Attorneys
covered by the Civil Legal Aid Standards must understand and
respond to the diversity of their clients and target communities to
provide effective representation.
Beyond that, organizations
providing civil legal assistance to indigent litigants are supposed to
reflect the diversity of their client population.78 The goal of these
staff diversity efforts is to create a legal team that is “well-qualified
and competent, sensitive to low-income persons and their legal needs,
and committed to providing high quality legal services.”79
These objectives are consistent with much of the legal
scholarship on cultural competence that explores how ethnic,
linguistic, and socioeconomic differences among individuals and
between attorneys and their clients may impact the provision of legal
services.80 The Civil Legal Aid Standards rightly recognize that
attorneys who lack cultural competence have difficulty forming
relationships of trust and communicating effectively with their
clients. The Civil Legal Aid Standards also note that a provider’s
insensitivity to client cultural values of clients might discourage
others from within the client’s community from seeking legal
assistance.81
76

ABA S TANDING C OMMITTEE ON L EGAL A ID AND I NDIGENT D EFENDANTS ,
S TANDARDS FOR THE P ROVISION OF C IVIL L EGAL A ID , iii–iv (2006) [hereinafter
C IVIL L EGAL A ID S TANDARDS ], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_d
efendants/ls_sclaid_aba_civillegalaidstds2007.authcheckdam.pdf.
77
Id. at 56–57.
78
ABA S TANDARDS FOR THE P ROVISION OF C IVIL L EGAL A ID , S TANDARD 2.7
(2006).
79
Id. at STANDARD 6.1.
80
Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyers, 8 C LINICAL L. R EV . 33, 41–42 (2001).
81
C IVIL L EGAL A ID S TANDARDS , supra note 76, at 64.

21

22

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

In addition to the Civil Legal Aid Standards, the ABA introduced
guidelines for pro bono program administrators at nonprofit
organizations. The Pro Bono Standards, adopted in February 1996
and revised most recently in 2013, offer much of the same guidance
regarding attorney competence and client-centered representation set
forth in the Civil Legal Aid Standards. In contrast to the highly
subjective standard of competence stated in Model Rule 1.1, the Pro
Bono Standards also establish objective and precise measures of case
handling success. They require practitioners to “strive to achieve
meaningful and lasting results responsive to clients’ needs and
objectives,” including the goals of “client self-sufficiency and
empowerment” and law reform on behalf of disadvantaged
persons. 82
These standards also mandate that pro bono
administrators at nonprofit organizations ensure their attorney
volunteers’ cultural competence and sensitivity to clients. 83 In
August 2013, the ABA’s House of Delegates revised its Standards
for Programs Providing Civil Pro Bono Legal Services to Persons of
Limited Means to address the lack of guidance regarding “formal pro
bono programs” without revising its existing approach to articulating
practice standards.
Nevertheless, the Pro Bono Standards were not intended to revise
Model Rule 6.1.
They establish guidelines for nonprofit
administrators, legal services attorneys, and board members of
organizations responsible for referring low-income individual to pro
bono attorneys. Conspicuously absent from this list are the private
sector law firms and associates retained to represent pro bono clients.
In fact, the drafters confirmed that the Pro Bono Standards were “not
intended to create any mandatory requirements or minimum
standards for performance.”84 These guidelines only address the
nonprofit organizations that establish formal pro bono service

82

ABA S TANDARDS FOR P ROGRAMS P ROVIDING C IVIL P RO B ONO L EGAL
S ERVICES TO P ERSONS OF L IMITED M EANS , S TANDARD 2.16 (2013), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/news/PDF/109.pdf.
83
Id. at S TANDARD 4.3.
84
ABA S TANDING C OMMITTEE ON P RO B ONO S ERVICES , S TANDARDS F OR
P ROGRAMS P ROVIDING C IVIL P RO B ONO L EGAL S ERVICES TO P ERSONS OF
L IMITED M EANS , 2 (1996), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/standards.html.
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programs, not law firm attorneys who occasionally handle referred
matters on a pro bono basis.85
III.
A.

SELF-REGULATION FAILURES IN THE PRO BONO MARKET

Competence Defined by the Bottom Line
In most cases, “the economics of practice and workplace controls
explain a good deal of the ethical behavior” and professional conduct
norms that attorneys apply to their work.86 Pro bono proponents
assume that large firms apply the same ingenuity and tenacity
extended in support of corporate advocacy to the cases they handle
for indigent persons. In so doing, they ignore the many practical
restraints that consign justice gap representations to a lower standard
of professional conduct.
Firms attract paying clients by promising to provide high quality
performance and positive outcomes. Major law firms highlight their
ability to coordinate interdisciplinary teams, quickly conduct legal
research on novel, complex issues, and provide reliable advice to
clients. 87 For example, the prominent law firm, Jones Day,
85

Id. at 8.
Shadamiah, supra note 32, at 368.
87
On its website, for example, Cravath notes that it is “frequently retained by
defendants confronted with major new lawsuits or stunned by massive judgments”
and that its litigators represent clients “before administrative agencies and
regulatory authorities and in virtually every other type of proceeding.” Litigation,
C RAVATH , S WAINE , & M OORE LLP, http://www.cravath.com/practices/litigation/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014). Sullivan & Cromwell LLP states that its lawyers
form seamlessly integrated teams across relevant practices areas and are prepared
to handle any related or follow-on matters that arise in the course of litigation.
Litigation: Overview, S ULLIVAN & C ROMWELL LLP,
http://www.sullcrom.com/Litigation-Practices/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
Latham and Watkins LLP describes its attorneys as being “capable of providing
clients with immediate, high-quality legal expertise anywhere in the world.”
Litigation, L ATHAM AND W ATKINS LLP, http://www.lw.com/practices/Litigation
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014). Similarly, Hogan Lovells states that it maintains a
“highly collaborative culture” and assembles diverse teams both within the firm
and “in the wider community.” About Us: Overview, H OGAN L OVELLS,
http://www.hoganlovells.com/aboutus/overview/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
Morrison & Foerster boasts that “[c]reative thinking, and a passion for practical
solutions, inform all [the firm’s] work.” Practices, M ORRISON & F OERSTER ,
http://www.mofo.com/services/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
86
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explained, “[o]ver the long term, the quality of client service offered
by a firm determines its growth and success.”88 While this may be
true in the case of corporate clients that have a multitude of legal
service providers from which to choose, indigent clients and
nonprofit referral agencies have no way to directly impact a firm’s
profitability, the primary mechanism for imbuing Model Rule 1.1
with real meaning and client-directed safeguards.89
At the institutional level, law firms have no economic incentive
for regulating the quality of the pro bono service that their attorneys
provide to indigent clients. Pro bono matters do not determine law
firms’ staffing needs, and profits-per-partner are not contingent upon
outcomes in pro bono matters.90 When LSC reports and law firm
rankings published by The American Lawyer magazine assign a
market value to law firm pro bono work, these estimates merely
reflect the hourly rate normally charged by the law firm for the
attorneys who worked on the matter. They are not correlated to the
outcomes obtained for pro bono clients.91 Low-income persons who
cannot afford to retain lawyers during a legal crisis are incapable of
screening prospective counsel and exceedingly unlikely to retain
counsel to pursue malpractice claims against their pro bono
attorneys. Cash-strapped legal services organizations that are
dependent upon law firms for the provision of in-kind support and
financial contributions are poorly positioned to offer negative
88

Why Do These Differences Produce Better Client Service?, J ONES D AY ,
http://www.jonesday.com/principlesandvalues/clientservices/ (last visited Nov. 24,
2014).
89
Legal market observers estimate “that a typical corporation is working with 47
law firms at any given point, and even an average middle-market company is
working with eight.” Marlisse Silver Sweeney, 47: That’s How Many Law Firms
a Typical Company Uses, C ORPORATE C OUNSEL ,
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202650829523/47%3A-That%27s-How-ManyLaw-Firms-a-Typical-Company-Uses#ixzz2yvuJm8FP (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
90
Londen, supra note 40, at 925 (“A law firm employs the right-sized staff to
handle all the billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including
business development, firm administration and pro bono work. The firm also
usually has some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the
firm’s lawyers are willing to work.”); See Maley, supra note 58, at 6
(“Theoretically, lost billable revenue would be a cost of pro bono work, but in
practice we have not experienced that; pro bono work tends to come from other
non-billable lawyer time (social, leisure, etc.).”).
91
Sandefur, supra note 26, at 97.

2015

PRO BONO AND THE MODEL RULES

feedback about their referred clients’ experiences. 92 In fact,
nonprofit organizations possess very little information about the
track record of the law firms to which they refer clients or the
training of individual attorneys assigned to the matter.93 Moreover,
it is hard to imagine that institutional clients decide whether to retain
a particular firm on a billable matter based on unpublicized
outcomes achieved in justice gap pro bono cases.94
Moreover, the few reported cases that discuss attorney
misconduct in the pro bono context suggest that even egregious
ethical misconduct in the pro bono context will not result in courtimposed sanctions. In MC v. GC, for example, the New York
Supreme Court concluded that the attorney failed to effectively
communicate basic legal concepts, subjected the client to duress, and
92

See generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause:
How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters
for Social Change, 39 L. & S OC . I NQUIRY 62 (2014).
93
In my work at a nonprofit law firm, I have noted that public interest attorneys
involved in direct legal services work often lack a basic understanding of law firm
structure and do not appreciate the significant distinctions that exist among large
law firms. For example, they are unaware of which firms have larger litigation
departments and which firms are more focused on transactional practices. Given
the hyper stratification of the legal profession, even with the same geographic
location, lifelong legal services attorneys often fail to appreciate differences
among specialty practices and often refer to “firms” as an undifferentiated
monolith. In this context, it is highly unlikely that legal services organizations
would have the information required to carefully and accurately assess which
firms are best suited to handle particular types of matters. Even if the nonprofit
attorneys had time and inclination to learn about law firm practices, firms
themselves do not publicize their pro bono failures in a way that would empower
nonprofits in the pro bono referral process.
94
Furthermore, pro bono assignments involve one-time engagements with clients.
The framers of the Model Rules well understood that attorneys are more likely to
behave ethically when they have long-term relationships with the individuals to
whom they provide services. See M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 7.3
cmt. 5. However, the ephemeral nature of the pro bono attorney-client relationship
and the lack of accountability undermine pro bono attorneys’ incentives to invest
in improving the quality of services. Not surprisingly, firms implement few, if
any, quality control measures to gauge the effectiveness of their pro bono services.
Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7, at 101. Most follow the example of PBI’s
pro bono assessment guide, which simply takes an inventory of “pro bono efforts”
and policies, not outcomes or client satisfaction. Law Firm Pro Bono SelfAssessment Guide, P RO B ONO I NSTITUTE (2002).
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provided testimony that the court found to be “not reliable.”95 Yet,
remarkably, the court did not order the law firm to pay sanctions for
attorney misconduct. Beyond that, the judge shielded the individual
attorney from professional embarrassment by excluding her name
from the opinion.96
Another case, Maples v. Thomas, offers a chilling example of
how attorneys who mishandle even the most grave and consequential
pro bono matters may do so with impunity. In Maples, the Supreme
Court grappled with the question of whether a death row inmate who
had been abandoned by the attorneys who agreed to represent him on
a pro bono basis would be denied an opportunity to file a writ of
habeas corpus.97 Two associates from the law firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP agreed to represent Mr. Maples in connection with
his post-conviction appeal. 98 These attorneys filed the client’s
petition for relief, arguing that the client had been denied effective
assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of his
trial.99 Thereafter, the attorneys left the firm without communicating
the news of their departure to their client.100 The attorneys also
failed to seek the Alabama court’s permission to withdraw from the
representation.101 After the attorneys left the firm, the Alabama trial
court mailed copies of the order denying the client’s petition to his
attorneys at the law firm. Because the attorneys were no longer
employed by the firm, the documents “were not forwarded to
another Sullivan & Cromwell attorney. Instead, a mailroom
employee sent the unopened envelopes back to the court.”102 Shortly
thereafter, the client’s time to file a notice of appeal of that decision
expired, leaving him with no other options to challenge his death
sentence. 103 The Supreme Court’s decision contains nothing to
suggest that the law firm was required to pay any sanctions for its
failures.
95

MC v. GC, 25 Misc.3d 217, 219 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
Id. at 218 n.2.
97
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 914 (2012).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 916.
100
Id. at 919.
101
Id.
102
Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 920.
103
Id.
96
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The Model Rules’ approach to defining attorney competence
makes enforcement of this ethical norm particularly difficult in the
pro bono context. Rule 1.1’s drafters premised their explanatory
comments on the belief that attorneys will both possess and be
willing to employ generalist legal skills on behalf of clients, ideas
inconsistent with current practice trends. The comment explains:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or
prior experience to handle legal problems of a type
with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner
with long experience. Some important legal skills,
such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of
evidence and legal drafting are required in all legal
104
problems.
Yet, these are the practical skills that new attorneys assigned to pro
bono matters as a matter of professional development are unlikely to
possess.105
One recent New York case offers a rare glimpse into the degree
of preparation that new attorneys at elite law firms, the practitioners
most likely to handle “justice gap” pro bono cases, require to
competently handle relatively straightforward matters. The law firm
of Mayer Brown LLP assigned a junior litigation associate to a pro
bono matter 106 involving a landlord’s refusal to return a $6,400

104

M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2012).
Ann Marie Cavazos, Next Phase Pedagogy Reform for the Twenty-First
Century Legal Education: Delivering Competent Lawyers for a Consumer-Driven
Market, 45 C ONN . L. R EV . 1113, 1116 (concluding “[t]oday, law schools are
ineffective in their preparation of law students who are ineffectual in their ability
to be able to ‘hit the ground running’ to practice law”).
106
See Thomas Clozel and Chine Labbe v. Hasan Jalasi and Azra Jalisi, No.
11227/12, at 2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 14, 2014), available at
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/011614nervo.pdf. Although the client
does not appear to have been referred as part of a justice gap pro bono initiative,
the court noted, “counsel is not even billing its client for legal services.” Id.
105
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security deposit.107 The court rejected Mayer Brown’s claim for
attorney’s fees authorized under the relevant statute because it
believed the associate’s billing for researching “procedural rules,”
analyzing “pleading requirements,” and “becoming familiar with
basic court procedures that an attorney is presumed to know” was
inappropriate.108 The court explained:
To demand compensation for two hours of professional
or non-professional time over three days to accomplish
this essentially ministerial task, asserting it required
researching, drafting, conversing, conferring and
discussing of some sort, the court finds unbelievable.109
It is not the associate’s billing but rather, the judge’s misconception
about new attorney skills that appears incredible. This judge, like
the framers of Model Rule 1.1, presumed that an attorney admitted
to practice will possess basic knowledge that is neither stressed in
the law school curriculum nor required as a condition of admission
to the bar.
In contrast, the ABA’s Code of Professional
Responsibility, predecessor to the Model Rules, clearly distinguished
between standards required for admission to practice and attorney
competence.110 Yet without violating Model Rule 1.1, pro bono
initiatives place urgent legal matters in the hands of newly admitted
law firm associates with few of these generalist skills.
The term “developmental pro bono” refers to the practice of
strategically assigning law firm associates to perform free legal work
as a way of advancing the attorneys’ skills and facilitating
performance evaluations by more senior members of the law firm.111
The pro bono attorney in that case continues to receive a salary and
sharpens his or her skills without having to answer to a paying client
for any missteps or erroneous judgments made over the course of the
107

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2–4, 6.
109
Id. at 5–6.
110
See ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , EC 6-3 (1983).
111
Talent Management Trends: Law Firm Core Competencies and Pro Bono, P RO
B ONO I NSTITUTE (2011), available at
http://pbi.informz.net/admin31/content/template.asp?ps=15375&sid=15375&bran
did=4063&ptid=1053&uid=0&mi=1465561 (subscription required).
108
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representation. Any benefit conferred upon the client as part of this
capacity-building effort is almost incidental.
In many instances, firms use justice gap pro bono projects as a
way to develop young associates’ generalist skills.
This
“developmental pro bono” model arguably advances access to justice
objectives if firms limit these assignments to associates who receive
sufficient supervision. That is, firms that strategically accept pro
bono matters for associate development purposes should only do so
when more experienced practitioners are actively engaged in the
representation to ensure the more junior attorney’s compliance with
his or her ethical duty to provide competent and diligent
representation.
However, firms do not consistently deploy
developmental pro bono initiatives in this manner. Developmental
pro bono work often functions to enhance skills among firms’ least
experienced attorneys who lack adequate supervision.112
112

Law school graduates who immediately join large firms after graduation and
receive pro bono assignments upon arrival are not required to demonstrate
practical expertise in any area to gain admission to the bar. See Robert Rubinson,
Professional Identity as Advocacy, 31 M ISS . C. L. R EV . 7, 14–15 (2012)
(contrasting the bar exam’s emphasis on assessing applicant’s “superficial
familiarity” with the “classic roster of first year classes” with “board certifications
in medicine” that require prospective doctors to demonstrate expertise in various
areas). Some legal education reformers have concluded that “[e]ven by the end of
the third year of law school, most law students do not have a realistic
understanding of what most lawyers do.” Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five
Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L.
R EV . 55, 81 (2012). In better economic times for the legal industry, institutional
clients remained loyal to their law firm advisors, and firms easily passed along the
costs of training novice associates to their clients without fear of being supplanted
by a more efficient competitor. Patrick J. Schiltz explained, “[i]n the days of loyal
clients and lackadaisical monitoring of legal expenses, time that a senior lawyer
spent serving as a mentor, and time that a junior lawyer spent being mentored,
could be charged to a client.” Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the
Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 M INN . L.
R EV . 705, 743 (1998). A recent New York Times article noted that prior to the
Great Recession and resulting contraction in legal markets, “clients have
essentially underwritten the training of new lawyers, paying as much as $300 an
hour for the time of associates learning on the job.” David Segal, What They
Don’t Teach in Law School: Lawyering, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-schoolassociates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Today, firms
concerned about having their bills scrutinized by clients who may take their
business elsewhere need an alternative training model for their new attorneys.
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Elite law firms tend to view pro bono cases as opportunities for
junior attorneys to obtain generalist skills that will ultimately serve
commercial clients who are unwilling to finance new attorney
training and endure inevitable attorney errors.113 In fact, many law
firms discourage more experienced attorneys, the practitioners most
likely to possess the generalist skills, from undertaking pro bono
work.114 Particularly in this context, Model Rule 1.1’s approach to
defining competence without reference to outcomes or objective
standards renders pro bono clients vulnerable to inexperienced
attorney errors. Novice attorneys assigned to developmental pro
bono matters may receive less support precisely because decision
makers view this charitable volunteering as an opportunity for the
young attorney’s professional growth and satisfaction, not legal
work of consequence to the firm’s bottom line. As such, many
attorneys involved in developmental pro bono work are poorly
equipped to provide services that meet the minimum standards of
competence or other ethical requirements.
C.

Conflicts, Identity, and Case Selection

Not only do business imperatives and assignment practices work
against ensuring attorney competence in pro bono cases, many law
firms reject entire categories of public interest litigation in which
their attorneys already possess significant experience.
Most
practitioners recognize that encouraging attorneys to accept pro bono
matters within their for-profit practice area generally improves
attorney competence and increases case handling efficiency.115 Yet,
113

Controlling the “Costs” of Law Firm Pro Bono Work, P RO B ONO I NSTITUTE
(2010),
http://pbi.informz.net/admin31/content/template.asp?sid=7302&ptid=619&brandi
d=4063&uid=0&mi=652219.
114
Many junior associates have no experience speaking directly with clients.
While in recent years firms have increasingly turned towards outsourcing such
discovery-related tasks, junior associates still enjoy few opportunities to develop
their client interviewing and oral advocacy skills relative to their public interest
counterparts who generally conduct client intake and courtroom advocacy from
their first days on the job. Carpenter, supra note 8, at 72; Rhode, supra note 60, at
142.
115
Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts
in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 S TAN . L. R EV . 1395, 1414 (1998).
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many firms reject cases in these areas based on their misperception
that such matters present a “positional conflict” for the firm.
A genuine positional conflict involves representation of “two
unrelated clients in litigation before a court or administrative agency
on opposing sides of the same legal issue.”116 Given the nature of
elite firm practice, it is unlikely that many referred pro bono matters
could place a firm in a true positional conflict. Few prestigious law
firms directly represent landlords in low-income neighborhoods or
individual restaurant owners who violate minimum wage laws, for
example. In contrast, more liberally defined “business conflicts,” or
the perception that prospective institutional clients will be less likely
to hire the firm because of pro bono advocacy on behalf of certain
poor people, are much more likely to surface. 117 As Norman
Spaulding suggests, an attorney’s perception of his or her client’s
interests is inextricably linked with the attorney’s self-perception.
Attorneys who experience a particularly close alignment with their
clients’ business perspectives have “thick positional identities.”
These lawyers may be unwilling to accept pro bono work
inconsistent with the clients’ interests “out of fear that it may
alienate their paying clients,” even when the matter presents no
direct conflict under the Model Rules.118
Many pro bono advocates accept this conflation of business
interests and “positional conflicts.” Not surprisingly, given pro
bono’s relationship with law firms’ for-profit goals, many pro bono
proponents fail to question the expansive definition of conflicts
applied in the pro bono context. PBI, for example, cautions law
firms to avoid accepting pro bono cases that might present “issue
conflicts” wherein the firm could be asked to “argue a legal theory
which may not be in the best interest of a corporate client,”119 an
116

John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 T EX . L. R EV . 457,
464–65 (1993).
117
According to Sandefur, “law firms select pro bono projects with an eye to
avoiding those that might antagonize existing or potential clients.” Sandefur,
supra note 26, at 103. See also Rubinson, supra note 112, at 33 (“[M]any large
firms shy away from offending larger potentials or actual organizational clients,
and thus do not take on, for example, civil rights employment cases or
environmental cases.” ).
118
Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1418.
119
Working Effectively with Pro Bono Programs: Tips for Large Law Firms, P RO
B ONO I NSTITUTE 2 (2008).

31

32

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

approach that goes well beyond the requirements to avoid a conflict
under Model Rules 1.7–1.10.
Corporate attorneys with thick positional identities dominate
elite law firms. In the for-profit context, this approach ensures that
attorneys within the firm zealously advocate on behalf of their
clients. In the pro bono context, elite firms’ alignment with
powerful institutional clients may work to the detriment of access to
justice imperatives. Nearly half of all of the nation’s largest law
firms categorically refuse to accept plaintiff-side employment and
labor cases and rarely engage in consumer and environmental pro
bono work; nor do they readily accept civil rights matters that could
offend paying clients, even when attorneys in those firms have
extensive experience in the relevant subject matter or procedural
rules.120
Both existing and potential corporate clients exert significant
pressure on law firm attorneys to accept pro bono matters outside of
their areas of expertise. This decreases the efficiency in pro bono
work and increases the likelihood that novice attorneys who rely on
their firms’ internal resources will receive insufficient support for
quality control.121 Thus, the actual and potential financial interests
of paying clients impact the interpretation of conflict rules in the pro
bono context. By influencing case selection, the business interests
of future clients increase the probability that pro bono work will not
be performed with the same resources and informal collegial control
that define the firm’s standard practice. Model Rule 6.1 imposes no
countervailing duty on private sector attorneys to interpret conflicts
more narrowly to facilitate access to justice—even when doing so
might improve the quality of pro bono service.

120

Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7, at 97.
Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1420 (“[P]aying clients (in many instances
without even speaking a word on the subject) have a great deal of authority to
determine which public interest cases and pro bono clients are legitimate. Paying
clients thus help define the line between popular and unpopular clients of limited
means. . . . That some clients in the latter category have politically controversial or
morally charged legal problems is especially troubling, since it is the pro bono
representation of just these kinds of clients that, at least rhetorically, undergirds
the profession’s monopoly status.”).
121
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Cultural Homogeneity and Legal Services Triage

Class, cultural, and linguistic differences between attorneys and
their clients can erect barriers to effective representation.122 The
academic literature on cultural competence in legal service makes
clear that ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic differences among
individuals and between attorneys and their clients may impact the
provision of legal services.123 However, the lack of diversity within
elite law firms impacts justice gap pro bono work long before the
first attorney-client encounter. Just as with “positional conflicts,”
cultural preferences and exclusionary practices rooted in cultural
difference shape case screening and client referrals in ways that
hinder pro bono’s access to justice objectives.
Model Rule 1.2 states that “[l]egal representation should not be
denied to people who are unable to afford legal services.”124 Yet, the
impulse to provide an enjoyable experience for the pro bono attorney
frequently results in case selection practices flatly inconsistent with
Model Rule 1.2’s access to justice objective. Many pro bono
attorneys express a desire to work with “deserving clients.”125 On its
face, the term “deserving” could mean nothing more than that the
individual should have access to counsel; that is, every person
experiencing a legal crisis deserves legal assistance. In practice,
however, the term “deserving” often functions as a code word
signifying clients whose characteristics do not offend prevailing

122

See generally Deborah Archer, There is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of
Teaching the Next Generation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society,
4 C OLUM . J. R ACE & L. 55, 68–71 (2013); Annette Wong, A Matter of
Competence: Lawyers, Courts, and Failing to Translate Linguistic and Cultural
Differences, 21 S. C AL . R EV . L. & S OC . J UST . 431 (2014).
123
Bryant, supra note 80, at 41–42.
124
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
125
Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7, at 104. The ABA’s Military Pro Bono
Project advises individuals who refer cases to the association, “[w]e will be
counting on you to refer only the most meritorious and deserving clients.” 2013
Winter Newsletter: Military Attorneys (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.militaryprobono.org/news/article.466487ABA_Military_Pro_Bono_Project_2013_Winter_Newsletter_Military_Attorneys
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
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social norms within the law firm or who might negatively reflect
upon a firm’s image.126
Pro bono advocates often ignore the impact that poverty-related
prejudices can have on attorneys’ willingness to work with poor
people in crisis. As Michelle Jacobs explained, perceptions of
whether particular impoverished individuals are “viewed as being
‘undeserving’ or ‘unworthy’ extend to providers of legal services”
and influence the quality and scope of assistance provided to poor
clients.127 Jacobs’ limited empirical research on the degree to which
the definition of “zealous” advocacy was tied to conceptions of
social worth revealed, among other things, that law students varied
their decisions to assist clients based on the client’s racial and class
characteristics. 128 She also found that students’ assessment of
“equality” as a guiding principle varied considerably depending on
the ethnicity of the student.129 Since bar applicants need not undergo
cultural competency or anti-bias training as a condition of their
admission to practice, it is unlikely that law students’ attitudes
towards serving hyper-marginalized individuals will radically
transform once they become law firm associates assigned to pro
bono matters.130
The cultural landscape of elite law firms is poorly equipped to
counter this bias and prepare pro bono attorneys for the diversity
issues that arise in justice gap pro bono work. On the contrary, it
reflects recruiting and retention practices designed to ensure that the
associates, partners and corporate clients share a common culture.
Attorneys who are ethnic minorities and lawyers raised in low
socioeconomic backgrounds seldom attain positions of authority
within elite law firms.131 White attorneys constitute ninety-eight
126

Generally speaking, attorneys tend to prefer pro bono clients who more closely
resemble their paying clientele. Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78
F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2443, 2448 (2010).
127
Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between
Lawyer Values and Client Worthiness, 44 H OW . L. J. 257, 263 (2001).
128
See id. at 269–75.
129
Id. at 279–80 (noting “[w]hen the students of color were removed from the []
sample, equality’s ranking plummeted dramatically”).
130
Id. at 272–73.
131
Todd A. Berger, Jimmy Carter’s “Malaise” Speech, Social Desirability Bias,
and the Yuppie Nuremberg Defense: the Real Reason Why Law Students Say They
Want to Practice Public Interest Law, Yet So Few Actually Do, 22 K AN . J. L. &
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percent of the partners in the nation’s top one hundred law firms.132
Moreover, the attorneys who practice in these firms are drawn
overwhelmingly from the pool of graduates from highly ranked law
schools. Students at these institutions are twenty-four times more
likely to have been raised in families at the top ten percent of
earnings than in middle and lower income brackets.133 This lack of
economic diversity within the elite sectors of the legal community
exists even among the relatively few African-American and Latino
attorneys who enter top tier law schools and elite firms.134 Such
statistics paint an exceedingly grim picture of the true racial and
socioeconomic homogeneity at law firms that are the most likely to
accept justice gap pro bono cases.135
P UB . P OL ’ Y 139, 158 (2012) (African American and Latino attorneys are
significantly underrepresented in elite, for-profit law practice); Symposium, Tales
of Diversity: Lawyers’ Narratives of Racial Equity in Private Firms, 31 L. & S OC .
I NQUIRY 831 (2006); Luis J. Diaz & Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving
Door Syndrome in Law, 41 S ETON H ALL L. R EV . 947 (2011); Nancy Levit,
Lawyers Suing Law Firms: The Limits on Attorney Employment Discrimination
Claims and the Prospects for Creating Happy Lawyers, 73 U. P ITT . L. R EV . 65,
68 (2011); Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender
Equity in Law Firms, 24 G EO . J. L EGAL E THICS 1041, 1045–46 (2011); Eli Wald,
A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or
Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 G EO . J. L EGAL E THICS
1079, 1080 (2011); see also Rubinson, supra note 112, at 34–35 (law firms
emphasize “the crucial importance of graduating from an elite law school (and
thus being ‘the best and the brightest’)” as a “measure of the prestige accorded to
[their] lawyers”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to
“Diversity is Good for Business”: the Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments
and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 H ARV . L. R EV . 1548 (2004).
132
Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and
Rule of Law, 73 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2081, 2087 (2005).
133
Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 D ENV . U NIV . L. R.
631, 637 (2011).
134
Id. at 647.
135
The proponents of justice gap pro bono initiatives share the same elite status as
the attorneys who often handle these cases. The Association of Pro Bono Counsel
is a group composed exclusively of attorneys and administrative staff from major
law firms. Membership in the Association of Pro Bono Counsel is limited to
“[a]ttorneys who currently manage a law firm pro bono practice on a full-time
basis.” See Membership, A SSOCIATION OF P RO B ONO C OUNSEL ,
http://www.apbco.org/about/membership/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). Similarly,
the Pro Bono Institute’s fulltime staff, composed primarily of attorneys who hail
from major law firms, is governed by law firm and corporate counsel advisory

35

36

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

The class and cultural tensions that can arise while representing
indigent people often discomfit pro bono attorneys.136 This sector of
the bar seldom has extensive first-hand exposure to the conditions of
intergenerational poverty, identity-based discrimination, and
systemic disadvantage commonly experienced by low-income, civil
litigants. Often the conditions of deep poverty common in justice
gap lawyering test these attorneys’ desires to help a “deserving”
client. Theodore Fillette III, the Senior Managing Attorney of Legal
Aid of North Carolina referred to this phenomenon the “Cinderella
expectation syndrome” and explained:
[S]ome volunteers have little experience with
generationally poor persons and imagine that their pro
bono clients are idyllic Cinderella prototypes who are
industrious, polite, modest, grateful, and the victims of an
evil stepmother or some equivalent villain. In my view,
all of the Cinderella clients are represented by Perry
Mason or Matlock, leaving us with real clients who are
burdened with economic and cultural disadvantages.137
This perception of individual crises divorced from systemic
disadvantage is consistent with the notion that individuals who are
hard-working or dedicated to raising a family in an honorable way,
or honest, cooperative, or the like should receive some reward for
their individual character when legal services organizations allocate
resources.138 Many pro bono coordinators and attorneys share their
perspective and prefer a “good” pro bono experience that consists of
representing an appreciative and cooperative client with a single
legal problem who has no criminal background, mental health
concerns, or substance abuse history.
boards. Legal services attorneys and poverty law practitioners are largely absent
from both institutions.
136
As Jacob explained, “The lack of sufficient economic resources can inject a
constant level of instability and chaos into a client’s life. This may be
overwhelming to a lawyer, and [it] may even inhibit the lawyer’s ability to
understand how or why the client’s situation does not materially improve after the
lawyering interaction.” Jacobs, supra note 127, at 269.
137
Fillette, supra note 8, at 122.
138
Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor
Clients, 67 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 2475, 2495 (1999).
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In conceiving of the ideal, morale-boosting case, few pro bono
attorneys envision engaging in strained conversations with hypermarginalized individuals.139 Based on my first-hand experience as
an associate at a large, major market law firm, this is a feeling with
which I am somewhat sympathetic.
Exacting billable hour
requirements, job insecurity, and a lack of personal autonomy create
enormous stress for law firm associates. Consequently, the prospect
of working with a client who may present a maze of legal problems
and can appear to be uncooperative, unable to arrive at appointments
on time, or complicit in their own crises is understandably
unattractive. To avoid this potential discomfort, some pro bono
attorneys and coordinators simply refuse to serve the most
vulnerable clients in need of civil legal assistance. In so doing, elite
law firms’ pro bono participation can distort a nonprofit legal
services organization’s case handling priorities by reshaping the way
nonprofit organizations select and refer pro bono cases.
Leonore Carpenter, an experienced nonprofit attorney, referred
to law firms’ distortion of nonprofit legal services agendas as “triage
conflict.”140 Carpenter cautioned, “[t]riage conflict arises when the
case selection criteria of the public interest agency are directly
challenged by another entity” and when “pro bono seeks to impose
its business agenda on a public interest program” thereby
destabilizing the nonprofit’s mission by forcing a “misallocation of
scarce human capital resources.” 141 In justice gap pro bono
initiatives, nonprofit attorneys who conduct community outreach and
case screening constitute the primary human resources subject to law
firm misappropriation.
139

Moreover, evidence suggests that many people find cross-cultural
communications to be stressful. Bryant, supra note 80, at 59 (“[I]ntercultural
learning is often stressful precisely because it is change-oriented.”).
140
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 57.
141
Id. at 58–59. Carpenter goes on to describe one of her personal experiences as
legal director of a small nonprofit organization in which she felt pressured to
accommodate a law firm pro bono interest for “sexy” cases that were inconsistent
with her organization’s priorities. Id. at 60. Sandefur described how one formal
pro bono program organized to provide assistance with divorce proceedings was
reconstituted to address “consumer counseling . . . not in response to an
assessment of local legal need, but because the founders realized that ‘different
religious values’” among the pro bono attorneys staffing the project made the
program unappealing. Sandefur, supra note 26, at 100.
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Carpenter’s notion of “triage conflict” extends the discussion
sparked by Paul Tremblay’s seminal article on “weighted triage”
among poor clients. Therein, Tremblay described appropriate and
impermissible case selection criteria available to legal services
attorneys who face an overwhelming demand for services. 142
Among the principles legal services attorneys may ethically consider
are: the degree to which attorney intervention will make a
meaningful difference in the outcome of the dispute, conservation of
scarce institutional resources, the goal of maximizing the collective
benefit to the client community, prioritization of the “most serious”
legal matters, and preference for cases in which the attorney is likely
to achieve a favorable outcome over the long term instead of matters
in which the attorney can only obtain short term relief.143 One
impermissible factor to consider is a client’s perceived “social
worth.”144 Tremblay explained that if such perceptions were applied
in the triage context, “then clients deemed more deserving as the
result of some personal qualities or character would warrant some
privilege in the selection process.”145
Triage conflict in the justice gap pro bono context misdirects a
nonprofit organization’s case selection criteria by causing legal aid
attorneys to favor poor clients with high “social worth” when
referring matters to pro bono attorneys.
Some law firms
straightforwardly inform nonprofit referral organizations that their
attorneys are not interested in handling certain categories of
individuals such as clients with criminal or substance abuse
histories, for example. Other firms do not categorically reject clients
but simply decline to accept pro bono matters in which the client
falls short of the “Cinderella” expectations alluded to above.
Nonprofit organizations may respond to this reality by advising their
staff to “select the most sympathetic clients available,” offering “the
most meritorious claims to volunteers” and “not refer[ing] clients
with mental difficulties.”146 The unfortunate effect of this approach
142

Tremblay, supra note 138, at 2489–98.
Id. at 2490–93.
144
Id. at 2495–96.
145
Id. at 2495.
146
Fillette, supra note 8, at 118. Fillette went on to explain how the paralegal at
his organization “carefully screens potential clients and declines to refer ‘difficult’
personalities.” Id. at 121.
143
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to pro bono work is that referring legal services organizations feel
pressured to skim off easy clients (for example, speakers of standard
English who are meticulous and punctual) and easy cases (for
example, uncomplicated matters with a high likelihood of success)
for their pro bono partners. This violates Model Rule 1.2 and
contravenes the principles articulated in both the Civil Legal Aid and
Pro Bono Standards.
These rule violations are not simply
ideological concerns. They have the practical effect of concentrating
cases and clients that require more robust advocacy resources within
nonprofits instead of expanding the pool of attorneys available to the
entire target population. Ostensibly, justice gap pro bono exists to
increase the resources available to low-income persons in crisis.
Since, in many respects, pro bono service enhances the legitimacy of
the profession as a whole, it is deeply troubling that attorneys’ lack
of cultural competence frequently undermines this goal.147
Triage conflict is inconsistent with Pro Bono Standard 2.1 which
requires legal services providers to “identify the most compelling
needs of the low-income community” they serve.148 However, this is
yet another area in which law firms are poorly positioned to regulate
their ability to facilitate access to justice for poor people. It also
represents another lost opportunity for the ethics rules to set clearer
boundaries for whether and how a client’s perceived social worth
should enter the case selection process. The ABA acknowledged
that “most pro bono committees consider . . . the client” when
deciding whether to accept a prospective pro bono matter.149 Yet,
147

Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1421.
Most poverty law organizations aim to reach the most vulnerable members of
their client communities, those who are least able to self-advocate. Investing
resources into creating “feel good” opportunities for pro bono attorneys runs
counter to the objective of prioritizing services for the most vulnerable members
of the community. Yet, “[r]elatively few firms engage in any systematic
assessment of community needs or of the most cost-effective use of resources.
Seldom do they even survey their own membership about giving priorities or
attempt to monitor the satisfaction of clients or the social impact of particular
initiatives. . . . The result is often a mismatch between public needs, partner
priorities and associate satisfaction.” Symposium, The Lawyer’s Role in a
Contemporary Democracy, Promoting Access to Justice and Government
Institutions, Rethinking the Public in Lawyers’ Public Service: Pro Bono,
Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 F ORDHAM L. R EV . 1435,
1445 (2009).
149
T YRRELL , supra note 47, at 9.
148

39

40

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

neither the committee’s report on Model Rule 6.1 implementation or
subsequent commentary on the rules identify which client
characteristics would be acceptable to consider when deciding
whether to accept a case and which would be ethically impermissible
to take into consideration.150 Moreover, Model Rule 6.1 fails to cite
either the Civil Legal Aid or Pro Bono Standards 2.1 as guiding
principles for pro bono attorneys.
It is true that amending the Model Rules would not alter the
demographics of elite law firms or automatically develop cultural
competence among the young attorneys who are often assigned to
work with pro bono clients. Indeed, the existing Model Rules have
not curbed many undesirable practices that disadvantage paying
clients. Nevertheless, the ABA’s choice to omit references to the
Civil Legal Aid and Pro Bono Standards from Model 6.1 leaves
nonprofit organizations and pro bono firms with little guidance on
appropriate (and inappropriate) methods of pro bono case selection
to counter existing biases against clients whose “social worth” is
perceived to be low.
E.

Pro Bono Supervision
In theory, the large firm pro bono model effectively functions
precisely because such institutions aggregate resources, wisdom and
supervisory capacity to facilitate the work of junior attorneys. In
reality, however, junior attorneys frequently handle pro bono cases
with little or no supervision. This is particularly unsettling since
junior associates no longer receive the training and mentoring on
paying matters that once characterized law firm practice and might
150

The comments to Model Rule 6.2 on accepting appointments state that lawyers
fulfill their voluntary pro bono obligations by “accepting a fair share of unpopular
matters or indigent or unpopular clients.” M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’L C ONDUCT R.
6.2, cmt. 1. The rule advises against refusing appointments simply because the
client’s “character or cause” is “repugnant” to the appointed attorney. The Model
Code’s Ethical Considerations went further than the Model Rules in defining how
client “unpopularity” should impact case acceptance. Ethical Consideration 2-29
included court appointments and “bar association” referrals within the rule on
accepting appointments. It distinguished between an attorney’s “personal feelings”
and “community attitudes” that may be repugnant,” stating that the community
norms for social work should not be a reason for rejecting a particular client or
case. ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , EC 2-29.
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otherwise inform their pro bono work.151 Some ethics commentators
have argued that in the years following the adoption of the Model
Rules, firms have experienced a significant decline in informal
mentoring.152 This decline, coupled with an increased pressure to
bill for paid client work results in junior associates at firms being
less capable of independently analyzing the ethical dilemmas that
arise in day-to-day practice.153
Previous iterations of the ethics rules offered more particularized
guidance on supervision than what today’s junior associates
encounter in the Model Rules. Canon 6 of the Model Code, for
example, included an affirmative obligation to provide guidance into
an attorney’s ethical considerations.154 In contrast, Model Rules 5.1
and 5.2 regarding the responsibilities of supervising attorneys
principally address liability for professional misconduct, and impose
no affirmative obligation on senior lawyers to develop junior
attorneys’ competence. In like manner, they do not specify the type
of active participation and oversight will satisfy the “association”
requirement of Rule 1.1. In fact, Rule 5.1 leaves open the possibility
that even a partner “in charge of a matter” lacks “supervisory
authority” sufficient to confer responsibility for the rule infractions
of subordinates. Rule 5.2 merely discusses the circumstances under
which a junior attorney may be absolved of her responsibility for
actions undertaken at the behest of a supervisor. Neither rule
imposes an affirmative obligation on inexperienced attorneys to seek
out supervisory input to ensure that clients, including nonpaying
ones, receive competent services. Within the law firm pro bono
151

Bruce A. Green, Professional Challenges in Large Firm Practice, 33
F ORDHAM U RB . L. J. 7, 13–15 (2005).
152
See, e.g., Jean M. Cary, Teaching Ethics and Professionalism in Litigation:
Some Thoughts, 28 S TETSON L. R EV . 305, 311–12 (1998) (noting that in the “fastpaced, billable-hours-conscious . . . world of today . . . there is no formal or
informal mentoring mechanism” to help the new lawyer).
153
Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33 F ORDHAM U RB . L. J.
153, 161 (2005); see Green, supra note 151, at 15–16.
154
See ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , EC 6-2 (1983) (“A
lawyer . . . has the additional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal
profession, and he may do so by participating in bar activities intended to advance
the quality and standards of members of the profession. Of particular importance
is the careful training of his younger associates and the giving of sound guidance
to all lawyers who consult him.”).

41

42

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

context, senior associates and partners are the attorneys most likely
to possess the generalist skills needed to represent clients
competently.
Yet, firms often fail to engage experienced
practitioners in pro bono matters, even in a supervisory capacity,
due, among other things, to the misperception that partners’ highly
specialized skills are inapplicable to the pro bono representation.
Attorney specialization is nothing new, but its impact on pro
bono supervision is something that the Model Rules do not address
and pro bono proponents fail to apprehend. Today, attorneys at
preeminent law firms are not simply litigators and transactional
practitioners. Law “office practice” narrowly tailored to offer
business advice to corporate clients surpassed courtroom advocacy
as the preeminent form of legal work among the elite members of the
bar by the early twentieth century.155 By the 1930s, legal scholars
had already begun to criticize the impact of business specialization
and the lure of corporate practice on the ability of the legal market to
serve “the poor man’s case.”156 The dramatic expansion of large law
firms that occurred in the late twentieth century significantly
increased the need for business lawyers to specialize their services to
increase job security and marketability.157 Their firms expect them,
from an increasingly early moment in their careers to become
experts in, for example, the use of asset backed securities in
structured finance or defense counsel in securities litigation. That
specialization requires a high degree of focus on the problems of a
particular industry and encourages attorneys to see themselves as
agents of that sector’s legal interests. As a consequence, associates
often overlook the general lawyering expertise of partners or
consider it to be inapplicable to the “specialized” legal issues
presented in the pro bono case. Moreover, the pro bono clients
themselves—indigent litigants with low dollar-figure claims—are
155

See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C.
L. REV. 1003, 1022, 1038 (1994).
156
Id.
157
Timothy Hia, Que Sera, Sera? The Future of Specialization in Large Law
Firms, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 541, 551 (2002) (“From the 1970s to the 1990s, large
law firms in major U.S. cities experienced a phenomenal spate of personnel
growth—between 1975 and 1985 alone, the fifty largest U.S. firms each more than
doubled in size. In 1988, the largest firm in the country had 962 lawyers. By
2000, however, six national firms had personnel counts that exceeded that
number.”).
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individuals so dissimilar from the firm’s corporate clientele that their
legal issues appear entire foreign to the partner. This misperception,
coupled with the Model Rules’ lack of readily actionable advice
regarding pro bono supervision harms the practice of public interest
law in distinct yet intersecting ways.158
The ABA acknowledged shortly after adopting Model Rule 6.1
that without robust supervisory protocols in place, “the pressure of
other [paying] work is more likely to lead to the improper discharge
of obligations to pro bono clients.” 159 Maples v. Thomas, 160
discussed in Section III-A, supra, provides a startling example of
how pro bono supervision failures can cause serious harm to indigent
clients. While media coverage of the case has fixated on the socalled “mailroom mix up” that resulted in return of a copy of the
Alabama court’s decision to the state clerk’s office,161 that focus
obscures the multiple ways in which the firm lacked adequate
systems of supervision for pro bono work. As a preliminary matter,
the firm allowed two junior associates to leave the firm without
reassigning their pro bono case. The large firm approach to staffing
corporate matters makes such egregious failures in communication
and case oversight unlikely to occur, irrespective of any professional
conduct rules.
However, without a profit motive, image
enhancement potential or legal malpractice threat defining their
practice norms, firms have little incentive to supervise pro bono
matters in a way that protects against associate error. 162 The
158

Matthew Paul Crouch, In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in
the Wake of Disaster, 65 S.C. L. REV. 465, 482–83 (2013) (citing Wiley A.
Branton, Symposium, Katrina and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis: Natural
Disasters and the Rule of Law: Professional Responsibility in Crisis, 51 HOW. L. J.
677, 728 (2008); see also Cummings and Sandefur, supra note 7, at 102–03 (citing
survey responses in which attorneys believed that “in some areas the [relatively
inexperienced] associate knows more than the partner” with significantly greater
knowledge of general lawyering skills and ethical obligations).
159
Tyrrell, supra note 47, at 11.
160
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 914 (2012).
161
See, e.g., Adam Liptik, Justices Rule for Inmate After Mailroom Mix-up, N.Y.
T IMES (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/coryr-maples-must-be-given-second-chance-after-mailroom-mix-up-justicesrule.html?_r=0.
162
Putting aside the case handling failures that nearly cost Mr. Maples his capital
appeal, the law firm’s violation of the duty of loyalty is perhaps a more shocking
ethical failure. After the firm discovered its errors the firm created a conflict of
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stunning lack of supervision and other ethical duties on display in
Maples is likely to arise in major law firms only when attorneys
serve clients on a pro bono basis. The ethics rules should, but do not,
advise against this foreseeable reality.
Public interest organizations devote considerable resources to
micromanaging referred pro bono cases in the absence of law firm
supervision, often at the expense of the nonprofits’ case handling
capacity.163 Pro bono attorneys frequently conceive of the referring
public interest attorneys as both supervisors and sources of logistical
support, notwithstanding the existing supervisory structures within
their law firms.164 In the same vein, associates who view their pro
bono engagements primarily as sources of professional development
often rely on nonprofit staff to offer detailed input into their case
handling, even in the absence of a co-counseling agreement.165 The
hours that nonprofit attorneys spend providing “support” to pro bono
lawyers can exceed the time they would have spent handling the case
themselves. From an ethics perspective, these ongoing requests for
help lay bare the law firms’ noncompliance with the Model Rules’
supervision guidelines. Nevertheless, nonprofit attorneys who
compete for much needed pro bono assistance may feel compelled to
closely supervise pro bono attorneys as a way to attract volunteers.
In so doing, their supervision of law firm associates, outside of the
co-counseling context, encourages firms to violate Model Rules 5.1
interest between itself and Mr. Maples by “not ced[ing] Maples’ representation to
a new attorney” due to its “interest in avoiding damage to its own reputation.”
Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 925 n.8.
163
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 71.
164
In my own experience, associates who become busy on paying client matters
frequently ask to “give back” a referred client to nonprofit organizations, even
after the firm has executed a retainer agreement with that individual. In one
immigration case my organization referred to a major New York City law firm, the
two associates assigned to represent the client admitted that they were unable to
give the case “the attention it deserves” in light of the client’s limited English
proficiency. They then asked if the attorneys who screened the matter could “step
in” since their billable work had become more demanding. This perception of
joint supervision was also present in the MC v. GC, a New York divorce case. MC
v. GC, 25 Misc.3d 217, 218 nn.2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
165
The LSC’s Pro Bono Task Force found that pro bono attorneys require, among
other things, “a commitment that there is someone at the legal aid organization
they can call for advice and encouragement.” P RO B ONO R EPORT , supra note 28,
at 5.
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and 5.2 and functions as a disincentive for firms to improve their pro
bono case oversight. Both pro bono programs and clients suffer as a
consequence.
IV.
A.

CONTEMPORARY PRO BONO PRACTICE AND INADEQUACIES IN THE
MODEL RULES
Ambiguity in the Professional Conduct Rules

Since law firms themselves have no market-based rationale for
policing the quality of services provided to pro bono clients, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct should assume an even greater
role in regulating attorney behavior in this area. Nevertheless, the
ABA has not reformed the Model Rules to provide sufficient
guidance on how lawyers in private practice should navigate the
complexities of pro bono service. As discussed more fully in
Section II-C, supra, the ABA has promulgated standards to guide the
work of nonprofit administrators and full-time poverty lawyers.
However, those standards expressly exclude law firms, leaving those
attorneys on their own to decide how, if at all, the existing Model
Rules apply to the pro bono work they perform.
The explanatory comments that follow Rule 6.1 do not require
attorneys to offer the same scope or caliber of serve that they would
normally provide to paying clients. Commentary to Rule 6.2 comes
closest to providing guidance to pro bono attorneys regarding their
ethical obligations to nonpaying clients. It says:
An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to
the client as retained counsel, including the
obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is
subject to the same limitations on the clientlawyer relationship, such as the obligation to
refrain from assisting the client in violation of the
Rules.166
That Model Rule 6.1’s commentary does not expressly include pro
bono clients among those entitled to equal application of the Rules is

166

M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 6.2, cmt. 3 (2012).
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particularly striking given the structures that exist to protect clients
who are appointed counsel and subject to Rule 6.2’s guidelines.
Typically, assigned counsel programs administered through
courts and bar associations impose experience requirements and
performance standards on attorneys that far exceed the “competence”
defined under Model Rule 1.1. For example, federal statutes specify
the level of experience required for private attorneys to serve
indigent criminal defendants through the Criminal Justice Act
program.167 California’s appellate defense panel rules require panel
applicants to demonstrate that they have “sufficient experience,
knowledge and skill to perform the requisite tasks with a minimum
amount of assistance from the administrator.” 168 Appointed
attorneys must also submit “recent writing samples” that evince his
or her “strong research and writing skills, including demonstrating
the ability to analyze facts; recognize, analyze, research, organize
and argue issues; use persuasive analogies and distinctions in citing
precedent; and communicate clearly and concisely.”169 In New York,
individual attorneys who participate in assigned counsel programs
are required to describe, among other qualifications, how their
advocacy in at least one case “produced a beneficial result that was
outside the norm for that particular type of case” as a condition of
recertifying their appointment eligibility.170 Similarly, the Juvenile
Court panel overseen by the Chicago Bar Association requires
program applicants to identify, inter alia, details about the attorney’s
trial and appellate experience, the names of three attorneys
experienced in the relevant practice area who can serve as references,

167

See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(b) (“If the appointment is made before judgment, at least
one attorney so appointed must have been admitted to practice in the court in
which the prosecution is to be tried for not less than five years, and must have had
not less than three years [sic] experience in the actual trial of felony prosecutions
in that court.”).
168
Criteria for Placement on a Court of Appeal Indigent Defense Panel, J UDICIAL
C OUNCIL OF C ALIFORNIA (2012), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/placement-criteria-coadefense(1).pdf.
169
Id.
170
Application for Recertification to the Criminal/Supreme Court Panel, N EW
Y ORK S TATE U NIFIED C OURT S YSTEM (Feb. 15, 2014 6:45 PM), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad1/Committees&Programs/18B/index.shtml
(follow link to “Recertification Application”).
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and information about the attorney’s language skills. 171 This
approach is consistent with that of assigned counsel projects in
Massachusetts, Florida, and other jurisdictions.172 In contrast, most
pro bono initiatives accept volunteers without imposing any
experience-related restrictions on participation. While appointed
counsel programs generally exist to guarantee due process rights not
present in many justice gap pro bono cases, there is no legal basis for
subjecting clients facing urgent matters such as those involving
imminent eviction, debt collection actions, and child custody
disputes to a lesser standard of professional conduct.
B.

Model Rule 1.1 and the Challenge of Developmental Pro Bono
By placing it at the beginning of the Model Rules, the rule
framers established competence as the bedrock of an attorney’s
ethical obligations. The professional duty to provide competent
representation first appeared in the ABA’s Model Code in 1970.173
Many, but not all, of the aspirational statements set forth in Canon 6
of the Model Code’s Ethical Considerations were incorporated into
Model Rule 1.1. For example, Ethical Consideration 6-2 noted the
importance of “training younger associates” and included “the giving
of sound guidance” as part of an attorney’s duty to provide and
promote competent service.174 Canon 6’s explanatory notes made
clear that a client had “a right to expect that the lawyer will have
devoted his time and energies to . . . know where to look for the
171

Juvenile Court Bar Attorney Application, C HICAGO B AR A SSOCIATION (2010),
available at
https://www.chicagobar.org/AM/NavigationMenu/Services/LRSRegistration/Appl
ications/Juvenile_Court_Application.pdf.
172
Committee for Public Counsel Services Assigned Counsel Manual Policies and
Procedure, Ch. 3, M ASSACHUSETTS C OMMITTEE FOR P UBLIC C OUNSEL
S ERVICES (2014), available at
http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/CURRENT_MANUAL_20
14/MANUALChap3-Revised%201-15-14.pdf; see, e.g., Court-Appointed Counsel,
T HE E IGHTH J UDICIAL C IRCUIT OF F LORIDA , http://www.circuit8.org/courtappointed-counsel (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
173
Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the
Competence of Lawyers, 61 T EMP . L. R EV . 1211, 1218 (1988).
174
See ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , EC 6-2.
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answers” to the client’s problems and “to know how to advise to the
best of his legal talents and sensibilities.”175 The notes to Canon 6
also cited the New York case of Degen v. Steinbrink176 in which the
court affirmed, “[i]f the attorney is not competent to skillfully and
properly perform the work, he should not undertake the service.”177
The ABA’s Model Rules mandate competent representation, but
they do so without referencing outcomes or attorney work product
quality; nor do they underscore the rights of clients that were
included in Canon 6 of the Model Code. The lack of objective
criteria in the Model Rules’ articulation of ethical values increases
the likelihood that ethical norms will be applied in a more contextspecific fashion. In the case of law firm pro bono service, the
decision not to include more specific measures of the knowledge,
preparation, and thoroughness required to provide competent service
inadequately instructs novice attorneys, especially those who
practice without robust supervision.178
Rule 1.1 requires attorneys to possess “the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation without identifying any end result of those
“reasonably necessary” actions.”179 The comments to Model Rule
1.1 focus exclusively on an attorney’s subjective assessment of
competence and his or her individual perceptions of adequate
preparation.
They state: “A lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”180
Nevertheless, without some reference to the desired outcome of the
representation, the comment leaves attorneys with little practical
guidance with which to assess “adequacy” of services or “necessary”
preparation. Nothing in Rule 1.1 limits attorney competence to the
knowledge and skill possessed at the moment an attorney accepts a
new matter, an omission that facilitates assignment of developmental
175

ABA M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , C ANON 6 n.1.
Degen v. Steinbrink, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922), aff’d mem., 142 N.E. 328
(1923).
177
M ODEL C ODE OF P ROF’ L R ESPONSIBILITY , C ANON 6 n.3.
178
Even outside of the pro bono context, the Model Rules’ generality and
vagueness undermine their ability to improve attorney conduct, absent a
compelling business rationale for enforcing high quality standards. See Schiltz,
supra note 112, at 714.
179
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
180
Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
176
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pro bono matters to attorneys who lack basic training and
preparation.181 Attorneys with few generalist skills are left to define
for themselves what amounts to “reasonably necessary” knowledge
and “reasonable preparation” to handle the case competently.182
Some critics of the Model Rules have noted that how “a lawyer
performs is not regarded as relevant to the lawyer’s competence.”183
This is certainly true in the pro bono context.184 Under a strict
reading of Rule 1.1, an attorney need not possess knowledge and
skill sufficient to make violation of other ethics rules or court
requirements unlikely. Likewise, the attorney has no affirmative
obligation to possess knowledge and skill sufficient to guarantee a
reasonable chance of success at trial. The Model Rules provide few
objective indicators of what passes for “zeal” in the context of client
advocacy.185 For the reasons discussed in Section II-B, supra, this
lack of guidance is largely irrelevant in the work of elite law firms
where well-heeled clients who pay exorbitant fees can rightly expect
competition for their business. Pro bono clients at the mercy of free
legal services providers wield no equivalent power to defend against
attorney incompetence.
Furthermore, an inexperienced practitioner could interpret some
of Model Rule 1.1’s commentary to suggest that pro bono matters
are, by their nature, subject to lower standards for knowledge and
preparation than cases typically handled by private law firms. The
explanatory comments state that the “required attention and
preparation” for an attorney to meet the competence standard “are
determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex
transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters
of lesser complexity or consequence.”186 Attorneys in elite firms
routinely handle cross-border transactions and multimillion-dollar
disputes. For them, justice gap pro bono will rarely appear to
181

Christopher Sabis & Daniel Webert, Understanding the “Knowledge”
Requirement of Attorney Competence: A Roadmap for Novice Attorneys, 15 G EO .
J. OF L EGAL E THICS 915, 918–19 (2002).
182
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 4 (2012).
183
Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the
Competence of Lawyers, 61 T EMP . L. R EV ., 1211, 1221 (1988).
184
Cf. Danielle R. Cover, Pro Bono Grievances, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 375, 404–14 (2014).
185
Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1427.
186
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2012).

49

50

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

present “major” litigation issues or matters of great financial
consequence. This is particularly true when the attorney handling
the pro bono matter has had few, if any, opportunities to witness the
cascading disasters that flow from a denial of government benefits,
eviction or other legal crises that arise in the lives of civil legal aid
clients. The Rule’s suggestion that matters of lesser complexity may
be subject to a reduced standard of competence is especially
problematic in light of the negative attitudes towards poor clients
addressed by Jacobs and others.187
The ABA recently reviewed the Model Rules, including Rule 1.1,
to evaluate whether changes in the profession necessitated a
clarification of “competent” service. Nevertheless, the Ethics 20/20
Commission’s revisions to Model Rule 1.1 add little clarity to how
attorneys can objectively assess competence in pro bono
representation or otherwise. The amended commentary states that
attorneys “should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology”
to comply with Model Rule 1.1.188 The rule revisions also address
legal outsourcing, including “nonfirm lawyers” within the scope of
Rule 1.1. The Ethics 20/20 revisions failed to incorporate clientcentered, objective measures of attorney competence that could
assist attorneys in evaluating their professional conduct when
competition for profit and the malpractice threat do not otherwise
define competent service.
C.

Model Rule 1.18 and Pro Bono Referral Practices

The justice gap pro bono model significantly alters the contours
of
attorney-client
relationships
by
including
multiple
intermediaries—nonprofit referring organizations and non-practicing,
pro bono coordinators—into the case selection, conflicts checking
and engagement initiation processes. Nonprofit organizations
typically serve as the first point of contact for prospective, pro bono
clients. Law firms with formal pro bono programs generally do not
solicit their own indigent clients, even though Model Rule 7.3 would
187

Jacobs, supra note 127, at 264–65, 267–75.
ABA C OMM ’ N ON E THICS 20/20, ABA R ESOLUTION 105C, 1, 2 (2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_ho
d_annual_meeting_105c.authcheckdam.pdf.
188
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permit them to do so.189 Instead, these firms typically rely on the
staff of nonprofit organizations to conduct community outreach,
meet with prospective clients, and “screen” individual cases for
placement suitability before referring clients to pro bono
coordinators within the firm. The pro bono coordinator reviews the
matter, distributes information about the prospective case with
attorneys at her firm and, if successful in her placement efforts,
initiates a conflicts check. Coordinators may occasionally reach out
to firms in search of a pro bono opportunity that will satisfy an
associate’s personal or professional development interests.
Pro bono coordinators aim to connect associates with pro bono
cases that will not interfere with the associate’s obligations on
billable matters and will result in overall associate satisfaction. To
achieve these objectives, coordinators may ask the nonprofit
organization’s “screeners” to disclose additional facts about the
matter beyond what is required to check for potential conflicts. In
my experience as a law firm associate assigned to pro bono matters
and a public interest attorney who has placed hundreds of pro bono
cases with law firms, I have observed that the coordinator’s goal is
generally to assess the complexity of the case and desirability of
working with a specific client. The coordinator and pro bono
attorney may ask the prospective client to undertake additional steps
as a condition of securing pro bono representation. In adoption cases,
for example, pro bono coordinators may agree to accept a referred
case only if the prospective adoptive parent procures extrajudicial
consents from the child’s biological parents to avoid contested
matters or lengthy due diligence searches. When assessing public
benefits claims, coordinators may inquire about a prospective pro
bono client’s prior criminal or substance abuse history regardless of
the legal arguments at stake. Coordinators may also probe the merits
189

M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2012) provides, “[a] lawyer
shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit
professional employment when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain.” Comment 5 makes clear that this restriction “is not
intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected
activities of public or charitable legal- service organizations or bona fide political,
social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose purposes include
providing or recommending legal services to their members or beneficiaries.” Id.
at R. 7.3 cmt. 5.
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of particular claims and defenses to avoid exposing associates to
litigation in which the associate is unlikely to prevail. Even after the
firm accepts the representation, nonprofit attorneys often act as an
intermediary, at least in the preliminary stages of the relationship
between the indigent client and pro bono law firm.
This case selection and referral arrangement fundamentally
restructures the relationships among the attorneys and prospective
clients contemplated by Rule 1.18 of the Model Rules. Model Rule
1.18 was adopted to protect prospective clients by making preretention communications confidential and addresses limitations on
pre-retention disclosures required for conflicts purposes.190 Model
Rule 1.18 had no counterpart in the Model Code and was included
by the Ethics 2000 Commission “in response to the Commission’s
concern that important events occur in the period during which a
lawyer and prospective client are considering whether to form a
client-lawyer relationship” that were inadequately addressed in other
Model Rules.191 The most recent revisions to Rule 1.18, adopted in
2012 in conjunction with the Ethics 20/20 review, overlook the
growing importance of pro bono work in legal services delivery for
the poor. Those amendments primarily address changes that expand
the methods through which prospective clients contact lawyers.
Tellingly, those provisions are crafted to protect attorneys from
being forced into a relationship as a result of unilateral
communications from prospective clients and individuals seeking to
disqualify counsel.192
While Model Rule 1.18 was drafted to address client
vulnerabilities and confidentiality concerns, nothing in it establishes
boundaries on the nature and scope of information that pro bono
attorneys can gather on prospective pro bono clients; nor does it
suggest any consequences for pre-retention conduct in the pro bono
190

Id. at R. 1.18 cmt. 3 (describing how information revealed during preliminary
communications will be used “to determine whether there is a conflict of interest
with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to
undertake”).
191
ABA, A L EGISLATIVE H ISTORY : T HE D EVELOPMENT OF THE ABA M ODEL
R ULES OF P ROFESSIONAL C ONDUCT , 1982-2005 (2005).
192
ABA C OMM ’ N ON E THICS 20/20, ABA R ESOLUTION 105B, 1, 2 (2012),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_ho
d_annual_meeting_105b_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
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context. If, for example, a pro bono client obtains documents at a
law firm’s behest as a condition of securing representation, the
question of whether the client reasonably can conclude that an
attorney-client relationship exists after he or she secures the
requested material remains unresolved in the rule. The rule also fails
to address the nonprofit organization’s concern that by acting as an
intermediary between the client and pro bono firm during these
stages of the relationship, the client may justifiably presume that the
nonprofit attorneys are actually her lawyers, regardless of the referral
arrangement that the nonprofit and law firm have established.
Nothing in Model Rule 1.18’s explanatory comments resolves these
practical concerns. Likewise, Model Rule 1.2 regarding the
allocation of authority between client and lawyers provides that
attorneys “shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and . . . shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”193 However, it is
often the pro bono coordinator and an attorney from the referring
non-profit legal organization who negotiates over the scope of
service the law firm will provide on a pro bono basis, without any
input from the pro bono client.
D. Model Rule 1.4 and Effective Communication with Pro Bono
Clients
Some critics of the Model Rules maintain that the rules ignore
and exclude ‘outsider’ clients, low-income or minority individuals
who constitute the bulk of the pro bono clients referred for free legal
services at major law firms. 194 Others have argued that the
193

M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012).
In describing the Model Rules’ failure to account for non-normative family
relationships when addressing confidentiality and communication with
unrepresented parties, Carolyn Grose explained, “because they are written in the
language of individual rights and autonomy, and conflict and adversity, all of these
rules ignore the possibility of connections among multiple ‘parties,’ the
complexity of familial and domestic arrangements, and the nuances of
communication and problem-solving across interests and values. This particular
regime of truth—the system of ethical regulation—operates by failing to recognize,
let alone appreciate, the different sets of values, priorities, customs, and
relationship structures of ‘outsider’ clients.” Carolyn Grose, “Once Upon a Time,
In a Land, Far, Far Away . . .” Lawyers and Clients Telling Stories about Ethics
194
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sociocultural understandings that inform the Model Rules are
inconsistent with many aspects of practice outside of the elite law
firm context where clients frequently lack understanding of legal
norms due to “different linguistic and cultural understandings.”195 I
propose that the Model Rules, particularly Model Rule 1.4 on
communication, offer little practical guidance for pro bono attorneys
who share limited common understanding with their clients and that
lack of instruction hinders pro bono practice.
Under Model Rule 1.4, attorneys must “promptly inform the
client of any decision or circumstance” that requires the client’s
“informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e)” and reasonably consult
with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are
to be accomplished.”196 As the representation progresses, Rule 1.4
requires the lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information” from the client.197 The Rule further requires the
lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”198
The Rule’s comments highlight the need for clarification of how
this standard should apply in the context of justice gap lawyering.
For example, they explain “[i]n some situations—depending on both
the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility
of consulting with the client—this duty will require consultation
prior to taking action.”199 However, the commentary outlines no

(and Everything Else), 20 H ASTINGS W OMEN ’ S L. J. 163, 177–78 (2009). In a
similar vein, Spencer Rand noted that the Rules’ definition of ethical conduct
provides little or no direction to practitioners interested in advancing a social
justice agency on behalf of poor persons unable to retain counsel. Spencer Rand,
Teaching Law Students to Practice Social Justice: An Interdisciplinary Search for
Help Through Social Work's Empowerment Approach, 13 C LINICAL L. R EV . 459,
459 (2006).
195
Liwen Mah, The Legal Profession Faces New Faces: How Lawyers’
Professional Norms Should Change to Serve a Changing American Population, 93
C ALIF. L. R EV . 1721, 1732 (2005).
196
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
197
Id. at R. 1.4(a)(3).
198
Id. at R. 1.4(b).
199
Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 3.
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factors to be considered by an attorney who must decide whether the
action requires prior consultation with the client.
Even attorneys who do not routinely represent indigent clients
recognize that discussions with “bewildered, distraught, and legally
inexperienced clients must take different forms than communication
with legally sophisticated clients with well-defined objectives.”200
In poverty law practices, clients are also likely to have disabilities,
limited English proficiency or other characteristics that challenge
effective communication. Pro bono attorneys from elite firm
settings must navigate these communication-related concerns with
individual clients while being acculturated to work with institutional
clients who share few, if any, of these attributes.
Not only do these attorneys lack professional experience
communicating with clients in crisis, the Model Rules’ indeterminate
approach to describing effective communication standards provides
little guidance to pro bono practitioners. Model Rule 1.4’s
comments regarding attorney-client communications mention
nothing about working with clients who have limited English
proficiency or use sign language to communicate. Model Rule 1.4
also requires attorneys to communicate to the extent necessary to
keep a “comprehending, responsible adult” informed about the
representation.201 Neither the text of the rule nor its interpretative
comments describe which concepts an adult must “comprehend” to
meet this reasonable client standard; nor do they define what makes
an adult “responsible.” How can an attorney properly discharge his
or her ethical obligations under Model Rule 1.4 with an adult client
who is legally “competent” but has had very little formal education?
To what degree must attorneys educate their clients about the
American court system when the client is unfamiliar with our
adversarial process? What steps should an attorney take to ensure
that his client with limited English proficiency truly comprehends
the information the attorney needs to share? The Model Rules and
their interpretative commentary offer no instruction in these areas.
To the extent the Model Rules’ approach relies on “informal
normative frameworks provided by communities of practice” to

200
201

Levin & Mather, supra note 11, at 69.
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 6 (2012).
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supplement and particularize ethics norms, pro bono attorneys do not
benefit from such institutional support.202
The client base of the nonprofit organization involved in the MC
v. GC case discussed at the outset resembles that of many legal
services organizations in major cities that refer indigent clients
through pro bono initiatives. The overwhelming majority of its
clients are people of color, and one third of them live in “the poorest
urban county in the United States.”203 Twenty-five percent of their
clients are non-English speakers. 204 Not only do its clients
experience high levels of poverty and a lack of language access to
essential services, more than eighty percent of them are domestic
abuse survivors. The percentages of clients in each of these
categories may vary at nonprofit legal organizations around the
country, but domestic violence, family law, housing and public
benefits are prevalent within legal services practices for low-income
people.205 Moreover, income eligibility at LSC-grantee organization
and other legal nonprofits is generally restricted to extremely lowincome individuals. 206 Any pro bono attorney who agrees to
represent clients referred from these programs should be aware of
the financial and other needs of client populations from ethnically
and linguistically diverse populations, as well as persons with
disabilities and individuals who have experienced significant
trauma.207
The ABA’s Standing Committee on Pro Bono offers few
resources to develop pro bono attorneys’ cultural competence and
client sensitivity. It prepared a two-page brochure that outlines tips
for working with clients from “generational poverty” backgrounds
202

Levin & Mather, supra note 11, at 70.
Who We Serve, H ER J USTICE , http://www.herjustice.org/content/view/35/42/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
204
Id.
205
PRO BONO REPORT, supra note 28.
206
See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c) (2009). The Legal Services Corporation’s
regulations establishes a maximum income level equivalent to one hundred and
twenty-five percent (125%) of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. While some clients
whose income reaches 200% of the poverty level may receive assistance under
certain circumstances, it still restricts access to LSC and affiliated pro bono
attorneys to persons of low income. According to the 2014 guidelines, the stated
maximum amounts to an annual income of $29,813 for a family of four.
207
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 127, at 282–84.
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but largely overlooks the client demographics that distinguish justice
gap pro bono from for-profit representation.208 Similarly, not one
publication in the PBI’s clearinghouse is devoted to exploring racial,
cultural or linguistic diversity in pro bono practice.209 It is true that
some law firms and pro bono advocates provide cultural competency
training to their attorneys and some academic institutions have
developed relevant resources for volunteer lawyers, 210 but these
programs amount to more of an exception than a rule in pro bono
practice.
Attorneys who accept referred pro bono matters may be hesitant
to embrace the notion that “culture” matters in their definition of
competence or application of ethics rules. They might even regard
cultural competency as an abstraction more relevant to political
correctness debates than to effective representation—until they find
themselves in an ethical conundrum with their pro bono client.
Insofar as individual ethics rules allocate decision-making authority
between an attorney and client or require the client’s informed
consent, an attorney’s professional conduct takes as its foundation
certain shared understandings with his or her client. Cultural
competence facilitates this shared understanding. An attorney who
meaningfully apprehends how a client’s beliefs, resources, and
values shape the client’s legal objectives is much better equipped to
formulate a case strategy and comply with the decision-making
allocation rules than an attorney who has only a limited
understanding of the client’s perspective.211
208

See ABA, Pro Bono Clients: Strategies for Success (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/publications.html.
209
See generally Law Firm Pro Bono Project Resource Clearinghouse, supra note
67.
210
The Feerick Center for Social Justice at Fordham Law School, for example, has
prepared comprehensive training materials on cultural competence for “emeritus,”
senior, and/or retired attorneys who participate in justice gap pro bono programs.
Managing Pro Bono: Training Resources, F ORDHAM U NIV . S CH . OF L AW
F EERICK C ENTER , http://law.fordham.edu/feerick-center/30506.htm (last visited
Feb. 19, 2015).
211
In my experience, the first and most patent ethical difficulties that arise after a
pro bono attorney accepts a referred client involve attorney-client privilege.
Corporate lawyers are trained to aggressively protect attorney-client privilege and
client confidentiality. In that context, attorneys are often confounded by their pro
bono client’s desire to include a family member, friend or some other third-party
support in the initial meeting. Few of these lawyers have reflected upon their
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The Need for Comprehensive, Pro Bono-Focused Review of the
Model Rules
The specific Model Rules referenced here are not the only ethics
rules that inadequately address the significant changes wrought by
justice gap pro bono programs. Most significantly for purposes of
this article, the Model Rules say nothing about a pro bono attorney’s
obligations to the clients to whom the legal services are provided. In
fact, the Model Rules only address the pro bono attorney’s rights to
refuse to provide pro bono services that would cause “undue
financial burden” or involve clients “so repugnant to the lawyer as to
be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's
ability to represent the client.”212
The lack of ethical advice on these fundamental questions is not
merely an academic issue. While working on pro bono matters as a
law firm associate and with pro bono attorneys, I have encountered
lawyers who appear to be genuinely confused about their client’s
identity. They often proceed on the misunderstanding that they are
rendering a service to the referring nonprofit organization rather than
the referred individual, a misapprehension exacerbated by many law
firms’ financial contributions to nonprofit organizations. 213 It is
hardly surprising that, in the absence of ethical guidance highlighting
the needs of pro bono clients, these disadvantaged individuals
receive inadequate attention by the very attorneys retained to act as
their advocates.
F.

Ethical Ambiguities in Legal “Backwaters”

Some argue that ABA’s ethics rules serve more of a symbolic
function rather than an instrumentalist one. 214 While the
client’s transportation or childcare needs; nor have they considered how
conducting the initial meeting in a well-appointed, corporate environment may
intimidate the client. Only after grappling with such questions do most pro bono
attorneys begin to reflect upon their need to adopt lawyering skills that balance
their ethical duties with their client’s experience.
212
M ODEL R ULES OF P ROF’ L C ONDUCT R. 6.2(b)–(c) (2012).
213
See generally Symposium, A Brief Moment of Opportunity: The Effects of the
Economic Downturn on the Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 33 U. A RK .
L ITTLE R OCK L. R EV . 435, 438 (2011).
214
Symposium, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 T EX . L. R EV .
639, 668–69 (1981).
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indeterminate approach to articulating ethics norms in the Model
Rules lends some support to this contention, I agree with ethics
scholars who conclude that formal professional conduct rules serve
three interrelated functions: they “protect the interests of clients,
safeguard the integrity of the legal system, and encourage high
standards of attorney conduct.” 215 Within that framework, the
application of legal ethics is controlled more by the cultural norms of
a particular practice community and cultivated habits of individual
attorneys rather than formal rules adopted by the ABA.216
Each subsector of the legal community, from securities defense
litigators at white shoe law firms, to public defenders in Legal Aid
offices around the country, establishes internal norms for
professional conduct.217 This “common law of ethics” consists of
“understandings that lawyers observe in their dealings with one
another . . . and with the courts” as well as social norms about how
attorneys within the particular community should treat clients.218 In
the various subsectors of elite firm practice, conventions on
competence, supervision, relationship formation, communication and
other ethical duties are largely shaped by the financial accountability
imposed by clients and the demands of adversaries. Elite law firms
that dominate the pro bono landscape develop thick positional
identities and associated practice conventions that reflect their
paying clients’ business needs. When attorneys in these firms
represent indigent clients on a pro bono basis, they depart from the
familiar confines of their practice norms and enter into an unfamiliar
terrain of low-status legal work where the customs of professional
conduct to which they are accustomed seem inapplicable.
Stratification and status hierarchies in legal work exist in both
the for-profit and public interest sectors and are directly relevant to
the application of professional conduct norms in the pro bono
context. The ethical concerns addressed herein are less likely to
occur when high status attorneys engage in pro bono work that
impacts their stature within their subsector of the legal community.
For example, class action litigation in civil rights matters represents
215
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a kind of “high status” public interest practice that is not the
mainstay of nonprofit lawyers who offer direct services to poor
individuals.219 Similarly, death penalty appeals can be construed as
a form of high status, public interest work inasmuch as those cases
have less to do with the facts surrounding an indigent persons’
experience and are more concerned with protecting the integrity of
the legal system as a whole.220 What most distinguishes justice gap
pro bono initiatives from high status, impact litigation is that they
connect the most elite, highly compensated members of the bar with
work that has been traditionally devalued within the legal
community.
Direct representation of poor persons in individual disputes over
essentials of life is the least prestigious sector of the profession. The
prevailing assumption is that full-time poverty lawyers are “‘low’
status lawyers who perform that kind of work because they cannot
get other jobs.”221 Marina Zaloznaya and Laura Beth Nielsen who
conducted ethnographic research into Chicago’s legal aid system
found that poverty lawyers continue to experience “ideological
marginality,” struggling with their commitment to social justice in a
profession that accords prestige to profit-generating work, “task
marginality” as they complete administrative tasks, and “status
marginalization” within the professional, particularly as they
advance in their careers.222 Civil legal services attorneys are often
derided by others within the legal community as being less capable
practitioners than their colleagues involved in impact litigation or
other types of public interest legal work.223
219

Symposium, Mechanisms and Consequences of Professional Marginality: The
Case of Poverty Lawyers Revisited, 36 L. & S OC . I NQUIRY 919, 921 (2011).
220
Since death penalty appeals do not involve “the merits of the death penalty, but
rather the integrity of the profession by which people are condemned,” these cases
are less likely to antagonize law firm attorneys’ sense of professional identity as
elite lawyers. Rather, they reinforce those attorneys’ elite status by placing them
in the position of defenders of the legal system as a whole. Tyrrell, supra note 47,
at 21.
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Jacobs, supra note 127, at 296.
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Symposium, supra note 213, at 927–38; see generally Jacobs, supra note 127,
at 295–96.
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Even during law school, students find that those interested in serving poor
clients find themselves at the bottom of the school hierarchy. Aliza B. Kaplan,
How to Build a Public Interest Lawyer (And Help All Law Students Along the
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In her incisive analysis of status and perceived value within the
public interest community, Rebecca Sharpless explained that “[a]
hierarchy of helping that puts individual service at the bottom has
existed in progressive lawyering theory and practice for the last half
century.”224 Sharpless noted that the high volume, poverty, and
overwhelmingly female make-up of civil legal services clients
parallels the relatively non-elite, lower income, largely female and
non-white composition of many civil legal aid lawyers. 225
Prejudices and misconceptions related to these characteristics have
resulted in denigration of direct legal services work and skewed the
perception of work done by civil legal services attorneys such that
direct services have been referred to as the “backwater” of
practice.226 While “the top status hemisphere of the legal profession
contains corporate lawyers,” the legal community’s “bottom
hemisphere” is populated by a disproportionately female group of
attorneys who represent individuals unable to afford counsel. 227
Justice gap pro bono initiatives transport “top status” lawyers into
the world of “bottom hemisphere” work without offering a clear
framework to guide attorneys’ professional conduct.
These perceptions of relative value within the legal profession
described by Zaloznaya, Nielsen, Sharpless and others influence
attorneys’ interpretation of existing professional conduct norms. In
the case of impact litigation or other forms of high status pro bono
work, attorneys at elite firms will perform in accordance with the
ethical norms that define his or her professional identity. Not only
Way), 15 L OY . J. P UB . I NT . L. 153, 155 (2013) (“Public interest law students often
find themselves at the bottom of their institution's hierarchy with regard to
resources, programs, job search assistance, and relevant course work.”); Rebecca
Sharpless, More than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in
Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 C LINICAL L. R EV . 347, 359 (2012); Symposium,
supra note 213, at 935 (reporting that poverty lawyers “claimed that private firm
and corporate lawyers often treated them as if they were in some way less
qualified professionally”); see also Chiaki Ota, Legal Humanitarian Assistance:
Instituting Disaster Response Clinics and Law Firm Engagement, 19 G EO . J. ON
P OVERTY L. & P OL ’ Y 515, 519 (2012) (“Within the legal culture, it is clear from
the percentage of law students advancing to corporate law that public interest law
is not fully embraced as a preferable practice, based on prestige and income.”).
224
Sharpless, supra note 223, at 359.
225
Id. at 361–62.
226
Id. at 361.
227
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will a high status matter confer prestige upon the pro bono attorney
and firm, it will require less of the non-legal administrative work
typically associated with poverty law practice that results in the “task
marginality” that Zaloznaya and Nielsen described.228 Arguing a
high profile civil rights case, for example, can advance a young
attorney’s reputation within and beyond his or her firm. On the
other hand, justice gap pro bono typically does not expose junior
associates to substantive areas of the law that directly relate to a
firm’s for-profit practices, nor do these matters usually involve highprofile issues that could raise the attorney’s profile within his or her
legal community subsector. Direct legal services, by definition,
require one-on-one interactions with disadvantaged clients in crisis,
advocacy in slow-moving and indifferent bureaucracies like public
assistance offices, and overextended state courts. Child custody,
divorce proceedings, eviction prevention, and administrative
hearings on public benefit denials rarely make headlines or offer
opportunities for elite practitioners to enhance their professional
stature.
Elite firms construct a narrative about their attorneys’ superior
educational pedigree and the intellectual complexity of corporate
practice, a narrative that equates “the large amount of money at stake
in large firm practice with social importance.”229 It follows, then,
that pro bono cases in which little money is at stake involving clients
with low social status are foreign to the legal community and the
ethical conventions that normally govern their behavior. These
attorneys consider pro bono work on behalf of indigent clients to be
a charitable activity, not legal work, precisely because to think
otherwise would challenge their positional identity. Yet, it is the
lawyer’s positional identity and associated practice conventions that
regulate day-to-day professional conduct by filling in existing gaps
in the Model Rules. For example, elite firms construct cross-practice
legal teams to comprehensively handle their corporate clients’ legal
concerns, notwithstanding the vague competence requirements of
Model Rule 1.1. Similarly, elite firms interpret the allocation of
authority between themselves and their institutional clients by
deferring to their clients’ superior understanding of the financial
228
229

Id. at 930–33.
See Rubinson, supra note 112, at 35.
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consequences of legal choices regardless of how applicable ethics
rules allocate decision-making authority. Unfortunately for many
indigent clients, the pro bono attorney’s departure from an elite
practitioner status results in a deviation from the “common law of
ethics” that normally governs their conduct.230
Thus, Justice gap pro bono exists in this state of ethical
liminality between the high status professional standards common to
the elite segment of private practice and charity work associated with
“undistinguished” lawyers for the poor. Any practical guidance
aimed at protecting pro bono clients and encouraging higher and
particularized standards of ethical conduct would strengthen the
integrity of the system of legal services delivery.
V.

CONCLUSION

Few would contest the notion that Model Rule 6.1 has played an
important role in increasing the number of attorneys who offer free
or reduced fee legal assistance to low-income persons. Yet in many
important ways, the thorny and nuanced balancing of interests
involved in justice gap pro bono initiatives has received inadequate
attention from the ABA, state-level ethics codes, and pro bono
advocates. Pro bono work continues to function as an afterthought
in the area of professional conduct. Even the ABA’s Ethics 20/20
Commission charged with reviewing the Model Rules to “keep pace
with social change and the evolution of law practice” missed an
important opportunity to improve ethical handling of pro bono work.
In fact, that Commission failed to include a single representative
from the Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service into
its working groups.231 In like manner, PBI and the Association of
230
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available at
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Pro Bono Counsel champion the business case for pro bono and
develop pro bono recommendations from the elite law firm
perspective. Neither the ABA nor justice gap pro bono proponents
sufficiently incorporate full-time advocates for indigent clients into
the decision-making process.
As a first step to address problems inherent in the justice gap pro
bono model, the ABA must include members of the Standing
Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service in any future revision of
the Model Rules and invite comments from civil legal aid attorneys
from different levels of practice to participate in the process. That
working group should incorporate guidance specific to pro bono
work into the Model Rules discussed herein. Second, the ABA
should consider amending Model Rule 6.1 to harmonize its language
with the principle articulated in Rule 6.2(3) that imposes “the same
obligations” on attorneys serving appointed and paying clients. The
commentary for this revised rule should incorporate the Civil Legal
Aid and Pro Bono Standards by reference, steps that hopefully
would transform state-level ethics guidance. Finally, the ABA must
commission a survey of nonprofit lawyers and pro bono clients to
assess the degree to which existing pro bono services operate in
accordance with the best practices outlined in the Civil Legal Aid
and Pro Bono Standards. Without improving participation of civil
legal aid lawyers and the voices of clients, pro bono programs will
continue to privilege law firms’ interests over the needs of indigent
clients.

General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Division, Young Lawyers Division,
Standing Committee on Specialization, Section on Law Practice Management, and
the National Organization of Bar Counsel. Id. In the most literal way, pro bono
administrators and clients did not have a seat at the table. Id. The Standing
Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services is focused on servicing moderateincome individuals, not persons eligible for most justice gap pro bono initiatives.
See Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services.html (last visited Nov.
24, 2014).

